Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

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1 2233 TTEEMMUUZZ PPEERRŞŞEEMBBEE SSAAYYI II: : Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1

2 Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ TÜZÜKLER 2009/15228 Vakıflar Tüzüğünün Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tüzük 2009/15229 Vakıflarda İntifa Haklarının Ne Suretle Tesbit ve İta Edileceği Hakkında 17/7/1936 Tarihli Vakıflar Nizamnamesine Ek Nizamnamenin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tüzük 2009/15230 Vakıf Zeytinlik, İncirlik, Fındıklık, Narenciye ve Meyvalıkların Satış Şekli Hakkındaki Nizamnamenin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tüzük BAKANLAR KURULU KARARLARI 2009/15158 Devlet Demiryolları İşletmesi Genel Müdürlüğünde 657 Sayılı Devlet Memurları Kanununa Tabi Olarak Görev Yapan Personele, 2009 Yılında Saate Kadar Fazla Çalışma Yaptırılması ve Saat Başına, 1,10 TL Fazla Çalışma Ücreti Ödenmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15165 Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumunca, 4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanununun 3 üncü Maddesinin (f) Bendi Kapsamında Yapılacak İhalelere İlişkin 2/4/2004 Tarihli ve 2004/7113 Sayılı Kararnamenin Yürürlükten Kaldırılması Hakkında Karar 2009/15173 Türkiye Tarım Havzalarının Belirlenmesine İlişkin Karar İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2

3 2009/15175 Gümrük Müsteşarlığı Gümrükler Genel Müdürlüğü Bünyesinde Yer Alan 2 Adet Şube Müdürlüğünün Muhabere ve Elektronik Dairesi Başkanlığına Bağlanması Hakkında Karar 2009/15191 Sürekli Görevle Yurt Dışında Bulunan Memurlara Ödenecek Aylıklara İlişkin Karar 2009/15205 Bazı İllerde Mahalli İdare Birliklerinin Kurulması Hakkında Karar 2009/15206 Kırıkkale İli, Bahşılı İlçesi, Karaahmetli Beldesi Hudutları Dahilinde Bulunan Alanın Karaahmetli Tabiat Parkı Olarak Belirlenmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15214 Yükseköğretim Kurumlarında Yabancı Uyruklu Öğretim Elemanı Çalıştırılması Esaslarına İlişkin Kararda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Karar 2009/15217 Akdeniz Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Bünyesinde Bulunan Akseki Sağlık Yüksekokulunun Kapatılması Hakkında Karar 2009/15218 İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Rektörlüğüne Bağlı Olarak Mimarlık Fakültesi Kurulması Hakkında Karar 2009/15219 Yaşar Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Bünyesinde Bulunan Mühendislik-Mimarlık Fakültesinin Kapatılarak Adı Geçen Rektörlüğe Bağlı Olarak Mühendisilik ve Mimarlık Fakültesi Kurulması Hakkında Karar 2009/15232 İzmir Üniversitesi Rektörlüğüne Bağlı Olarak Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu Kurulması Hakkında Karar 2009/ Sayılı Kooperatifler Kanununa Tabi Kooperatiflerde, Bir Ortaklık Payının Değerinin 100 (Yüz) Türk Lirasına Yükseltilmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15239 Gümrük Müsteşarlığının Taşra Teşkilatında Yer Alan, İzmir Gümrük ve Muhafaza Başmüdürlüğüne Bağlı Aydın Gümrük Muhafaza Müdürlüğünün Kaldırılması Hakkında Karar 2009/15241 Ayakkabı İthalatında Geçici Korunma Önlemi Uygulanmasına İlişkin Karar BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Millî Savunma Bakanlığına, İçişleri Bakanı Beşir ATALAY ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığına, Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanı Mustafa DEMİR in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere YÖNETMELİKLER Eczaneler ve Eczane Hizmetleri Hakkında Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Sağlık Meslek Liselerinde Görevli Stajiyer Öğretmenlerin Yetiştirilmelerine ve Stajiyerliklerinin Kaldrılmasına Dair Yönetmeliğin Yürürlükten Kaldırılması Hakkında Yönetmelik Sağlık Bakanlığına Bağlı Okullarda Okutulacak Ders Kitapları ile Eğitim Araçları Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Sağlık Bakanlığına Bağlı Eğitim Kurumlarını Hizmete Açma, Kapatma ve Bunlara Ad Verme Usul ve Esaslarına Dair Yönetmeliğin Yürürlükten Kaldırılması Hakkında Yönetmelik Sağlık Bakanlığı Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Sınıf Geçme ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Sağlık Bakanlığı Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Ödül ve Disiplin Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Sağlık Bakanlığı Anadolu Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Refik Saydam Hıfzıssıhha Merkezi Başkanlığı Merkez ve Taşra Teşkilatında Görevli Personele Döner Sermaye Gelirlerinden Ek Ödeme Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu AR-GE Projeleri İhale Yönetmeliği Türkiye Radyo-Televizyon Kurumu Sicil Amirleri Yönetmeliği Türkiye Radyo-Televizyon Kurumunda Memur Statüsünde İstihdam Edilen Personel Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Atatürk Üniversitesi Ön Lisans ve Lisans Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliği Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Önlisans ve Lisans Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik TEBLİĞ İnsan Taşımak Üzere Tasarımlanan Kablolu Taşıma Tesisatının Ruhsatlandırılması, Bakım ve İşletilmesine Dair Tebliğ (SGM: 2009/11) DÜZELTME: (21/7/2009 tarihli ve sayılı Resmî Gazete de Yayımlanan, Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumuna Yapılan Sigortalı ve İşyeri Bildirimlerinin Bazı Kurumlara Yapılması Gereken Bildirimler Yerine Geçmesine Dair Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik ile İlgili) İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3

4 Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Accounting and Economics Volume 45, Issues 2-3, Pages (August 2008) Conservatism and Debt Pages Anne Beatty, Joseph Weber, Jeff Jiewei Yu Despite the unquestionable influence of conservatism, disagreement remains about what economic demands lead to financial reporting conservatism. Research examining lenders demands for reporting conservatism has been questioned for ignoring conservative contract modifications. We document that these modifications exist but are not ubiquitous. We find contract modifications are more likely when agency costs are higher and litigation, tax and equity demands for conservatism are lower. However, we find a positive association between unexplained reporting conservatism and contract modifications, suggesting contractual modifications alone do not fulfill lenders demands for conservatism. 2. Background 2.1. Related research 2.2. Contractual mechanisms that make covenant calculations more conservative 3. Motivation and research design 3.1. Motivation 3.2. Measures of financial reporting conservatism 3.3. Measures of agency costs of debt 3.4. Measures of non-lender demands for financial reporting conservatism 3.5. Models of inclusion of conservative contract modifications 3.6. Model of reporting conservatism 3.7. Ex-post changes in reporting conservatism 4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 4.1. Sample selection İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4

5 4.2. Descriptive statistics 5. Results 5.1. The association between financial reporting conservatism and the use of income escalators 5.2. Change in reporting conservatism from before to after the debt contract 6. Results on tangible net worth covenants 7. Conclusions Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt Pages Wayne R. Guay Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context. 2. Discussion of debt covenants and financial reporting conservatism in resolving agency conflicts 3. Conservative adjustments to debt covenants 4. Discussion of the analysis by Beatty et al. (2008) 5. Conclusion İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5

6 Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations Pages Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis, Tracy Yue Wang We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events. 2. Theoretical foundation and research design 2.1. What triggers firms to go dark? 2.2. Going private vs. going dark 3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 3.1. Going-dark sample 3.2. Control sample 3.3. Going-private sample 3.4. Descriptive statistics 4. Results 4.1. The causes of going dark 4.2. The impact of SOX 4.3. The consequences of going dark 4.4. Post-deregistration analysis 5. Conclusions Appendix A. The deregistration process İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6

7 Disclosure policy: A discussion of Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008) on going dark Pages Jeffrey L. Coles LTW (2008) examine firms withdrawing from the SEC reporting system but continuing to trade on Pink Sheets. The paper finds that Sarbanes-Oxley increased the propensity of firms to go dark but, counter to conventional wisdom, had no significant effect on the rate of going-private transactions. Agency costs, as well as poor growth opportunities, proximity to financial distress, and increased compliance costs arising from SOX increase the propensity to go dark. Suggestions to improve the empirical implementation and interpretation involve including additional control and more suitable explanatory variables, and more attention to causation issues and to the quantification of economic significance. 2. A simple empirical framework 3. Leuz et al. (2008) on going dark 3.1. The LTW model 3.2. Sample design 3.3. Results 4. Strengths 5. Concerns 6. Concluding remarks Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence Pages Feng Li This paper examines the relation between annual report readability and firm performance and earnings persistence. I measure the readability of public company annual reports using the Fog index from the computational linguistics literature and the İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7

8 length of the document. I find that: (1) the annual reports of firms with lower earnings are harder to read (i.e., they have a higher Fog index and are longer); and (2) firms with annual reports that are easier to read have more persistent positive earnings. 2. Literature and hypotheses 2.1. Literature 2.2. The implications of annual report readability Current performance Future performance 3. Data and empirical measures of annual report readability 3.1. Sample 3.2. The readability measures 3.3. Summary statistics 3.4. Determinants of annual report readability 4. Empirical results 4.1. Current earnings and annual report readability 4.2. Earnings persistence and annual report readability 5. Beyond readability: additional lexical features of annual reports 6. Further analyses 6.1. Unexercised stock option holdings and incentives to obfuscate information 6.2. Future stock returns and annual report readability 7. Conclusions Appendix A. Steps to calculate the readability indices Appendix B. Steps to extract MD&A and Notes to the financial statements Discussion of Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence Pages Robert Bloomfield İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8

9 Li [2008. Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics, this issue, doi: /j.jacceco ] finds that firms with losses, or with transient income, write annual reports with long sentences and big words. I begin by discussing some explanations for Li's primary results, using his more detailed results, along with the results of related papers, to assess the plausibility of those explanations. I then briefly discuss the 10-K's of a single company over the course of 3 years, to provide more detailed insight into what might drive the length and readability of annual reports. Finally, I present some possible directions for future research. 2. Explanations 2.1. Obfuscation 2.2. Ontology 2.3. Attribution 2.4. Misdirection 2.5. Management by exception 2.6. Conservatism 2.7. Litigation 3. A simple case study 4. Future directions The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting Pages Karthik Ramanna I study the evolution of SFAS 142, which uses unverifiable fair-value estimates to account for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with the FASB issuing SFAS 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting. The result is interesting given this proposal was due in part to SEC concerns over İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 9

10 pooling misuse. I also find evidence consistent with lobbying support for SFAS 142 increasing in firms discretion under the standard. Agency theory predicts such unverifiable discretion can be used opportunistically. 2. Background to SFAS Hypotheses development 3.1. Is goodwill impairment in SFAS 142 due in part to pro-poolers? 3.2. Does discretion potential explain firms support for goodwill impairment? The number and size of reporting units Reporting-units fair-value-to-book-value (FTB) ratios The unverifiability of net assets The magnitude of impairment charges that can be managed 3.3. Implications and alternate explanations 4. Empirical analysis 4.1. Research design for H1a 4.2. Results for H1a 4.3. Research design for H1b and H Jointly modeling H2 (i.e., lobbying positions) and the lobbying decision 4.4. Distribution of firms lobbying on the original and revised EDs 4.5. Univariate results for H1b and H Multivariate results for H1b and H Robustness of multivariate results for H1b and H2 5. Conclusion 5.1. Summary of findings 5.2. Avenues for future research Appendix A. Comparison of impairment proposals Appendix B. High reporting-unit FTB ratios and the Comment Letter Position Appendix C. Two-level multinomial logit for the decision to lobby and lobbying positions İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 10

11 Discussion of The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting Pages Douglas J. Skinner Ramanna [2007. The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics] provides interesting and novel evidence on how firms use contributions from their political action committees (PACs) to members of Congress as a means of lobbying for preferred positions on the two exposure drafts that led to SFAS-141 and SFAS-142. My discussion raises some concerns about his main conclusion: that pooling firms lobbied the FASB to obtain a fair-value -based impairment rule to facilitate their ability to manipulate financial statements. I offer a more benign explanation and make some other observations about how this line of research could proceed in the future. 2. Main thesis of paper 2.1. Historical context 2.2. The literature on pooling and an alternative perspective 3. Evidence and results 4. Conclusions Acknowledgements The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts Pages Zhaoyang Gu, Jian Xue We show that although forecasts of independent analysts are less accurate ex post, they yield forecast errors that are more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns. This suggests that forecasts of independent analysts are superior to those of nonindependent analysts in representing ex ante market expectations. We also show that forecasts of İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 11

12 nonindependent analysts become more accurate and less biased, and produce forecast errors more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns when independent analysts are following the same firms than when they are not. This suggests that the presence of independent analysts disciplines the behavior of nonindependent analysts. 2. Motivation 2.1. Analysts conflicts of interest and prior findings 2.2. Ex post vs. ex ante forecast superiority 2.3. Disciplining effect of independent analysts 3. Sample, variable measurement and research design 3.1. Sample selection 3.2. Variable measurement 3.3. Research design 4. Results 4.1. Superiority of independent analysts vs. nonindependent analysts Forecast bias and accuracy tests Market association tests 4.2. The disciplining effect of independent analysts Descriptive statistics and univariate results Multivariate regression tests on forecast bias and accuracy Multivariate regression tests on market associations 4.3. Robustness checks The 12 investment banks targeted in the Global Settlement Alternative return accumulation periods Alternative forecast horizons The relative timing of forecasts Alternative matched samples The degree of independent analyst following Managed actual earnings 5. Conclusions İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 12

13 Endogenous entry/exit as an alternative explanation for the disciplining role of independent analysts Pages Thomas Z. Lys, Jayanthi Sunder Gu and Xue [2008. The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, this issue, doi: /j.jacceco ] study the disciplining effect of independent analysts on the accuracy and forecast relevance of the forecasts of non-independent analysts. One of the intriguing results is that while independent analysts issue inferior forecasts, their presence appears to reduce the forecast bias, improve the forecast accuracy and increase the forecast relevance of forecasts issued by non-independent analysts. We explore alternative explanations for the Gu Xue results. Our evidence of endogenous entry and exit of independent analysts provides a more compelling explanation for the reported results. 1. A straight-forward hypothesis with intriguing results 2. Evidence and interpretation of results 2.1. Findings 2.2. Measures of forecast quality Measuring accuracy independent of bias ERC as a measure of forecast quality 3. ERC tests 4. Alternative explanations 5. Endogenous entry and exit by independent analysts 6. Conclusion Earnings quality at initial public offerings Pages Ray Ball, Lakshmanan Shivakumar İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 13

14 We show that, contrary to popular belief, initial public offering (IPO) firms report more conservatively. We attribute this to the higher quality reporting demanded of public firms by financial statement users and consequentially higher monitoring by auditors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, press, and litigants, and to greater regulatory scrutiny [Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, ]. We also question the evidence of Teoh et al. [1998b. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, ] supporting the alternative hypothesis that managers opportunistically inflate earnings to influence IPO pricing. We conjecture that upward-biased estimates of discretionary accruals occur in a broad genre of studies on earnings management around similar large transactions and events. 2. Financial reporting by UK companies going public 2.1. Sample and summary statistics 2.2. Comparison of private-status and prospectus financials 2.3. Conditional conservatism 2.4. Analysis of discretionary accruals in IPO prospectuses 3. Re-examining the TWW data 3.1. Credibility of discretionary accruals magnitudes 3.2. Problems in estimating discretionary current accruals in the IPO year 3.3. Errors in estimating discretionary current accruals from balance sheet data 3.4. Use of pre-ipo total assets as a deflator 3.5. Bias in fitting the accruals model to out-of-sample data 3.6. Pre-IPO accruals 3.7. Are there frequent adverse post-ipo events? 4. Discussion and conclusions Earnings management and earnings quality Pages Kin Lo İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 14

15 Viewing the detection of earnings management from the perspective of a crime scene investigator sheds new light on prior research on earnings management and its close relative, earnings quality. The works of Ball and Shivakumar [2008. Earnings quality at initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, in press.] and Teoh et al. [1998. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, ] are used to illustrate the application of seven components of a crime scene investigation to earnings management research. 2. Did earnings management occur? 3. Who is responsible for earnings management? 4. By what methods have earnings been managed? 5. Who are the victims of earnings management? 6. What are the motives for earnings management? 7. Was there an opportunity to manage earnings? 8. What other explanations are there to explain what appears to be earnings management? 8.1. Estimates of discretionary accruals are too large to be plausible 8.2. Factors triggering the decision to issue an IPO also affect accruals and bias estimates of discretionary accruals in the IPO year 8.3. Estimating accruals using balance sheet data induces errors and bias 8.4. Using pre-ipo assets as a deflator creates a small denominator problem 8.5. Summary of alternative explanations 9. Conclusions Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing Pages Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 15

16 When liquidity plays an important role as in financial crises, asset prices may reflect the amount of liquidity available rather than the asset's future earning power. Using market prices to assess financial institutions solvency in such circumstances is not desirable. We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current market value of banks assets to fall below their liabilities so they are insolvent. In contrast, if values based on historic cost are used, banks can continue and meet all their future liabilities. We discuss the implications for the debate on mark-to-market versus historic cost accounting. 2. The model 3. The autarkic equilibrium 3.1. The banking sector 3.2. The insurance sector 4. The functioning of credit risk transfer 5. Liquidity pricing and accounting 5.1. Historic cost accounting 5.2. Mark-to-market accounting, solvency and contagion 6. An example 6.1. Banks in autarky 6.2. Insurance companies in autarky 6.3. Credit risk transfer 6.4. Historic cost accounting 6.5. Mark-to-market accounting, solvency and contagion 7. Discussion 8. Concluding remarks Do accounting measurement regimes matter? A discussion of mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing Pages Haresh Sapra İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 16

17 Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, Allen and Carletti show that marking-to-market interacts with liquidity pricing to exacerbate the likelihood of financial contagion between the two sectors. In this discussion, I lay out the main ingredients of their model and explain how they interact with liquidity pricing to generate financial contagion. I then discuss some limitations of their model and propose an interesting extension. 2. The financial system 2.1. The banking sector 2.2. The insurance sector 2.3. Optimal banking and insurance portfolios 2.4. Liquidity pricing 3. Ingredients for contagion 3.1. Accounting measurement and contagion 4. Comments 4.1. Solvency constraints 4.2. A possible extension of AC's model 5. Conclusion İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 17