Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

Transkript

1 1199 AAĞĞUUSSTTOOSS ÇÇAARRŞŞAAMBBAA SSAAYYI II: : Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Özkan, Özgür. Türkiye ekonomisinde kamu kesimi finansmanındaki iç borçlanma yöntemi: Ankara: Vergi Denetmenleri Derneği, Ekonometrik rekabet modelleme Pazar tepki analizi ve talep tahmini. İstanbul: İTO, İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1

2 Dünden bugüne İstanbul un işgücü ve istihdam yapısı. İstanbul: İTO, Canoğlu, Mehmet Ali. Şirketler muhasebesi: muhasebe tekniği, ticaret hukuku ve vergi hukuku yönlerinden. İstanbul: [Yayl. y.], İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2

3 Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Devlet Bakanı Faruk ÇELİK e, Devlet Bakanı Hayati YAZICI nın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığına, Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanı Ömer DİNÇER in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere İDARİ BAĞLILIĞIN DEĞİŞTİRİLMESİ KARARI Mersin İli Mezitli İlçesi Merkez Bucağı Yüksekoluk Köyünün, Aynı İlin Toroslar İlçesi Merkez Bucağına Bağlanması Hakkında Karar YÖNETMELİKLER 2009/15307 Madencilik Faaliyetleri İzin Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Acıbadem Üniversitesi Yabancı Diller Hazırlık Okulu Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliği Çankaya Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim ve Öğretim Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Çankaya Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Lisans Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Çankaya Üniversitesi Sürekli Eğitim, Danışma, Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (SEDAM) Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Fatih Üniversitesi Meslek Yüksekokulları Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Gaziantep Üniversitesi Naci Topçuoğlu Meslek Yüksekokulu Önlisans Eğitim-Öğretim ile Sınav ve Değerlendirme Esaslarına İlişkin Yönetmelik İstanbul Üniversitesi Sürekli Eğitim Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi Yönetmeliği Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Özyeğin Üniversitesi İngilizce Dil Hazırlık Programı Eğitim-Öğretim Yönetmeliği Yaşar Üniversitesi Satın Alma ve İhale Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik TEBLİĞ İşkolu Tespit Kararı (No: 2009/43) Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Financial Economics Volume 91, Issue 2, Pages (February 2009) Why is PIN priced? Pages Jefferson Duarte, Lance Young Recent empirical work suggests that a proxy for the probability of informed trading (PIN) is an important determinant of the cross section of average returns. This paper examines whether PIN is priced because of information asymmetry or because of other liquidity effects that are unrelated to information asymmetry. Our starting point is a model that decomposes PIN into two components, one related to asymmetric information and one related to illiquidity. In a two pass Fama MacBeth [1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3

4 Political Economy 81, ] regression, we show that the PIN component related to asymmetric information is not priced, while the PIN component related to illiquidity is priced. We conclude, therefore, that liquidity effects unrelated to information asymmetry explain the relation between PIN and the cross section of expected returns. 2. Data 3. The PIN model and its extension 3.1. The PIN model Estimation of the PIN model Empirical and PIN model implied moments 3.2. Model extension Model selection and estimation of extended model The preferred extended model PIN, PSOS and Illiquidity 4. Asset pricing results 5. Conclusion Appendix A. Database construction Appendix B. Expected value, variance, and correlations of buys and sells The performance of reverse leveraged buyouts Pages Jerry Cao, Josh Lerner Reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) have received increased public scrutiny but attracted little systematic study. We collect a comprehensive sample of 526 RLBOs between 1981 and 2003 and examine the three year and five year stock performance of these offerings. RLBOs appear to perform as well as or better than other initial public offerings and the stock market as a whole, depending on the specification. Evidence exists of a deterioration of returns over time. İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4

5 2. The evolution of the leveraged buyout market 3. Data 3.1. Identifying the RLBO sample 3.2. Supplemental data 4. An analysis of RLBO performance 4.1. Basic patterns 4.2. Performance of subsamples 4.3. Use of alternative benchmarks 4.4. Robustness checks 4.5. Variations over time 5. Cross sectional differences across RLBOs 6. Conclusions Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle Pages Sandra Betton, B. Espen Eckbo, Karin S. Thorburn The substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) in the market prior to launching a bid. Moreover, auction theory suggests that toehold bidding may yield a competitive advantage over rival bidders. Nevertheless, with a sample exceeding 10,000 initial control bids for US public targets, we show that toehold bidding has declined steadily since the early 1980s and is now surprisingly rare. At the same time, the average toehold is large when it occurs (20%), and toeholds are the norm in hostile bids. To explain these puzzling observations, we develop and test a two stage takeover model where attempted merger negotiations are followed by open auction. With optimal bidding, a toehold imposes a cost on target management, causing some targets to (rationally) reject merger negotiations. Optimal toeholds are therefore either zero (to avoid rejection costs) or greater than a threshold (so that toehold benefits offset rejection costs). The toehold threshold estimate averages 9% across initial bidders, reflecting in part the bidder's opportunity loss of a merger termination agreement. In the presence of market liquidity costs, a threshold of this size may well induce a broad range of bidders to select zero toehold. As predicted, the probability of toehold bidding decreases, and the toehold size increases, with the threshold estimate. The model also predicts a relatively high frequency of İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5

6 toehold bidding in hostile bids, as observed. Overall, our test results are consistent with rational bidder behavior with respect to the toehold decision. 2. Optimal toehold strategies 2.1. Game structure, payoffs, and optimal bids 2.2. Target management's optimal response 2.3. Optimal toehold strategy 2.4. Toehold threshold properties and testable hypothesis 3. Sample of takeover contests 3.1. Definition and construction of contests 3.2. Sample characteristics 3.3. Toeholds 4. Does toehold threshold bidding exist? 4.1. Estimating the threshold 4.2. Testing the toehold threshold hypothesis 5. Toeholds and takeover gains 5.1. Toeholds and average abnormal stock returns 5.2. Cross sectional determinants of bidder gains 5.3. When all bids fail 6. Conclusions Appendix A. Proof of propositions A.1. Proposition 1: optimal Stage 2 auction bids A.2. Proposition 2: optimal target response in Stage 1 A.3. Proposition 3: optimal toehold strategy Are fairness opinions fair? The case of mergers and acquisitions Pages Darren J. Kisgen, Jun QJ Qian, Weihong Song Over the period , 80% of targets and 37% of acquirers obtain a third party assessment of the fairness of a merger or acquisition. These fairness opinions do not affect İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6

7 deal outcomes when used by targets, but they affect deal outcomes when used by acquirers. The deal premium is lower in transactions if the acquirer obtains a fairness opinion, and is further reduced if multiple advisors provide an opinion. However, the acquirer's announcement period return is 2.3% lower if the acquirer has a fairness opinion, especially if the acquirer pays a high premium, indicating that investors are skeptical of these transactions. 2. Institutional background on the use of fairness opinions 3. Hypotheses development on the use, impact, and structure of fairness opinions 3.1. The use of fairness opinions (FO as a dependent variable) 3.2. Impact of FOs on transaction outcomes (FO as an explanatory variable) 3.3. Impact of FO structure and advisor type on transaction outcomes 4. Empirical tests and results 4.1. Description of data 4.2. Empirical tests on the use of FOs 4.3. The impact of FOs on transaction outcomes Deal completion Deal premium Announcement period returns of acquiring firms 4.4. Interpretation of results 5. Summary and conclusion Appendix A. Summary of implications of competing hypotheses regarding acquirer fairness opinions Appendix B. List of variables used in tests Does investor recognition predict returns? Pages Andriy Bodnaruk, Per Ostberg Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, ] shows that stocks about which not all investors are informed should yield a return premium. This premium depends on the shadow cost of incomplete İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7

8 information which in turn depends on the shareholder base, relative market size, and idiosyncratic risk. Utilizing a comprehensive database of Swedish shareholdings, we demonstrate that stock returns are positively related to the shadow cost. We also find that the shareholder base is negatively related to returns when controlling for size and idiosyncratic risk. Zero cost portfolios based on the shadow cost/shareholder base yield substantial trading profits that are never positively correlated with the market and are only modestly explained by the four factor model. 2. Testable hypotheses 3. The data and measures of the shadow cost 3.1. Individual stockholdings 3.2. Firm level information and other data 3.3. Measures of the shareholder base and the shadow cost 4. Empirical findings 4.1. Descriptive statistics 4.2. Portfolio sorts 4.3. Fama MacBeth regressions 4.4. Zero cost trading strategies 4.5. Components of the shadow cost and returns 4.6. Determinants of the shareholder base 5. Robustness 5.1. Seasoned versus young firms 5.2. The role of arbitrage 6. Conclusion Convertible bond arbitrage, liquidity externalities, and stock prices Pages Darwin Choi, Mila Getmansky, Heather Tookes In the context of convertible bond issuance, we examine the impact of arbitrage activity on underlying equity markets. In particular, we use changes in equity short interest following İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8

9 convertible bond issuance to identify convertible bond arbitrage activity and analyze its impact on stock market liquidity and prices for the period 1993 to There is considerable evidence of arbitrage induced short selling resulting from issuance. Moreover, we find strong evidence that this activity is systematically related to liquidity improvements in the stock. These results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of arbitrage activity. 2. Related literature 3. Arbitrage, liquidity, and stock prices: predictions 4. Data and sample selection 4.1. Short interest and convertible debt issues 4.2. Proxy for the presence of the convertible bond arbitrage strategy 5. Convertible bond arbitrage, liquidity, and stock prices 5.1. Summary of firm characteristics, by ΔSI portfolio 5.2. Impact of convertible bond arbitrage on liquidity and prices Average changes, by ΔSI portfolio Control sample Regression analysis 5.3. Long run returns 5.4. Robustness analysis: convertible bond arbitrage versus valuation shorts 5.5. Robustness analysis: potential endogeneity of arbitrage 5.6. Robustness analysis: other potential sources of volume 5.7. Further evidence of convertible bond arbitrage: Reg SHO data 6. Conclusion İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 9