T. C. MALTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ FEN-EDEBİYAT FAKÜLTESİ DERGİSİ

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1 T. C. MALTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ FEN-EDEBİYAT FAKÜLTESİ DERGİSİ İMTİYAZ SAHİBİ: Maltepe Üniversitesi adına Prof. Dr Kemal KÖYMEN, Rektör Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi adına Prof. Dr. Betül ÇOTUKSÖKEN, Dekan YAYIN KURULU / EDITORIAL BOARD YAYIN GENEL YÖNETMENİ / EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Doç. Dr. Güncel ÖNKAL YAYIN YÖNETMENİ / EDITOR Yrd. Doç. Dr. Narin BAĞDATLI VURAL YAYIN KURULU ÜYELERİ / EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS Prof. Dr. Belma AKŞİT Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kuntay ARCAN Prof. Dr. Sevil ATAUZ Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mehmet BOZOK Yrd. Doç. Dr. Erkan ÇAV Prof. Dr. Nermin ÇELEN Prof. Dr. Betül ÇOTUKSÖKEN Prof. Dr. Sabahattin GÜLLÜLÜ Prof. Dr. Nurgün OKTİK Doç. Dr. Muttalip ÖZCAN DERGİ SEKRETERYASI ve REDAKSİYON Doç. Dr. Güncel ÖNKAL Yrd. Doç.Dr. Narin BAĞDATLI VURAL Okt. Nermin YİĞİT Özlem TURAN BASKI: İLETİŞİM BİLGİLERİ fefdergi@maltepe.edu.tr Tel. (+90216) / 2232 Faks. (+90216) Yazışma Adresi TC. Maltepe Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Editörlüğü Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Marmara Eğitim Köyü Maltepe-İSTANBUL BASKI TARİHİ: 2014 ISS N: T.C. Maltepe Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi (FEF Journal) yılda iki kez yayımlanan, uluslararası hakemli, basılı ve eşzamanlı olarak çevrimiçi bir dergidir. Yayımlanan yazıların telif hakları T.C. Maltepe Üniversitesi ne aittir. Dergimiz TUBITAK- ULAKBİM SVBT2013 standartlarına uymayı kabul ve tahahhüt eder. Bu dergi para ile satılamaz. Yazıların sorumluluğu yazarlarına aittir. All the responbilities for the content of their articles belong to the authors. Bu dergi Philosopher s Index te ve EBSCOHost Veri Tabanında yer almaktadır. This journal is indexed in Philosopher s Index and EBSCOHost database. 1

2 BİLİMSEL DANIŞMA VE HAKEM KURULU / ADVISORY BOARD (Akademik ünvan ve soyadı sırasına göre) Prof. Dr. Bahattin Akşit Maltepe Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Prof. Dr Işıl Bulut Başkent Üniversitesi, Sosyal Hizmet Bölümü Prof. Dr. Erdal Cengiz Ankara Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Prof. Dr. Şahin Filiz Akdeniz Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Prof. Dr. Sabahattin Güllülü Maltepe Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Prof. Dr. Otfried Höffe Tuebingen Universitesi, Almanya Prof. Dr. Gürol Irzık Sabancı Üniversitesi Prof. Dr. Emine Onaran İncirlioğlu Maltepe Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Prof. Dr. Sevgi İyi Maltepe Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Prof. Dr. Çağlar Keyder Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Prof. Dr. Felix Koerner Pontificial Gregorian Universitesi, İtalya Prof. Dr. İoanna Kuçuradi Maltepe Üniversitesi İnsan Hakları Araş. Ve Uyg. Mr. Prof. Dr. Maija Kule University of Latvia, Letonya Prof. Dr. Zekiye Kutlusoy Maltepe Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Prof. Dr. Mircea Dumitru Bükreş Üniversitesi, Romanya Prof. Dr. Uluğ Nutku Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Prof. Dr. Ayşe Öncü Sabancı Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Prof. Dr. Aytül Çorapçıoğlu Özdemir Yorum Danışmanlık Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol ODTÜ Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. Uğur Ekren İstanbul Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. Taşkıner Ketenci Mersin Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. M. Ersin Kuşdil Uludağ Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Doç. Dr. Evgenia Makazan Zaporozhye National University, Ukrayna Doç.Dr. Güncel Önkal Maltepe Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. Muttalip Özcan Maltepe Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. Nazan Haydari Pekkan Maltepe Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Doç. Dr. Özgür Sarı Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Doç. Dr. Gerrit Steunebrink Radboud Universitesi Felsefe Bölümü, Hollanda Doç. Dr. Yıldırım Torun Yalova Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Doç. Dr. Ahu Tunçel Maltepe Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. Ertuğrul R. Turan Ankara Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. Ali Utku Atatürk Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Doç. Dr. Pınar Ünsal İstanbul Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Doç. Dr. Yıldıray Yalman Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Mühendislik Fakültesi Yrd. Doç. Dr. H. Özden Bademci Maltepe Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Narin Bağdatlı Vural Maltepe Üniversitesi, Sosyal Hizmet Bölümü Yrd.Doç.Dr. İdil Kaya Balkan Maltepe Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. O. Cem Çırakoğlu Başkent Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Erkan Çav Maltepe Üniversitesi, Sosyal Hizmet Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hakan Dilman Maltepe Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özlem Duva Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ülkü Güney Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mustafa Günay Çukurova Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Felsefe Gr. Öğt. Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Yeliz Gülcan Girne Amerikan Üniversitesi, KKTC Yrd. Doç. Dr. Şebnem Gülfidan Maltepe Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Cristian Iftode Bükreş Üniversitesi, Romanya Yrd. Doç. Dr. Figen Karadayı Maltepe Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Georgeta Moarcas Transilvanya Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, Romanya Yrd. Doç. Dr. Radoslaw Filip Muniak Varşova SWPS Kültür İncelemeleri Bölümü, Polonya Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özlem Oğuzhan Sakarya Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Yrd. Doç. Dr. Levent Önen Maltepe Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mahmut Özer Aksaray Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayşegül Sili Karatay Üniversitesi Sosyal Hizmet Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nafi Yalçın Melikşah Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Yrd. Doç. Dr. Zafer Yılmaz Atatürk Üniversitesi KK. Eğitim Fakültesi Çift körleme (blind-review) ilkesi gereği hakem kurulu yayımlanan sayıların içeriğine gore değişiklik gösterebilir. 2

3 EDİTÖRÜN NOTU 2001 yılından bu yana yayımlanmakta olan Maltepe Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisinin yeni birleşik sayısında (2010/1+2) yedi adet özgün makale ve bir kitap tanıtımı yer almaktadır. Makalelerin ortak özelliği sosyal bilimlerin çalışma alanına giren olgu, kavram ve anlayışları günümüz yeni okuma biçimlerinden faydalanarak değerlendirmeleridir. Teknolojik olanaklarımızı kullanarak Uluslarası düzeyde Philosopher s Index ve EBSOHost tarafından indekslenen dergimiz, yerel okuyucular için de açık arşiv sisteminde tüm sayıların en kısa zamanda internet sayfamızda da okunabileceğini müjdelemek isteriz. Saygılarımızla, Yayın Kurulu Adına Genel Yayın Yönetmeni Doç. Dr. Güncel ÖNKAL Kış 2013, Maltepe. EDITORIAL PREFACE Maltepe University FEF Journal has been publishing since 2001; and in this issue (2010/1+2) seven articles and a book review are included concerning topics of our faculty. The common feature of those articles in the fields of social sciences and humanities is the their way of reconsidering facts, concepts and understandings of reviews by taking advantage of current form of comparative interpretations. This journal is globally indexed in Philosopher s Index and EbscoHost ; and additionally, for local readers, we are going to open our full digital archive to public access as soon as possible. Best regards, On behalf of the Editorial Board/Editor-in-Chief Assoc. Prof. Güncel Önkal Winter 2013, Maltepe. 3

4 İÇİNDEKİLER / CONTENTS 1. AN INCLUSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC SPACE: HANNAH ARENDT AND JOHN DEWEY/ Ümit KARTAL BEAUVOIR, CANDIDE İN BAHÇESİNDE/ Deniz SOYSAL ANAYASA, İKTİDAR VE OTORİTE İLİŞKİSİ/ Seçkin SERTDEMİR ÖZDEMİR POLİTİKA VE KÖTÜLÜK; GEÇMİŞ ZAMANLAR, MODERN ZAMANLAR; HANNAH ARENDT: ŞİDDET ÜZERİNE / Burçak ÖZKAN HANNAH ARENDT VE İTAAT- İTAATSIZLİK GERİLİMİNDE İNSAN/ H. Özi HUNTÜRK ARENDT İN POLİTİK ÖZGÜRLÜK KAVRAMINA ELEŞTİREL BİR BAKIŞ/ Sibel KİBAR ROUSSEAU NUN UYGARLIK ELEŞTİRİSİNİN SINIRLARI YA DA BİRİNCİ VE İKİNCİ KONUŞMALAR ÜZERİNE KURAMSAL BİR DEĞERLENDİRME/ Armağan ÖZTÜRK İNSANLAR, İNSANLAR OLARAK GEREKSİZ KILININCA (KİTAP TANITIMI) /Aysel SAĞIR

5 AN INCLUSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC SPACE HANNAH ARENDT AND JOHN DEWEY Ümit KARTAL Araştırma Görevlisi Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Felsefe Bölümü Sistematik Felsefe ve Mantık Anabilim Dalı Abstract Through Arendt s reconsideration of the meaning of politics and the recovery of the public space from its collapse on itself in a peculiar way, we are provided a comprehensive framework to think about a more inclusive and democratic politics. Nevertheless, we are challenged by a set of problems: a very sharp distinction between the public realm and the private realm, a contrast between the social and political, and a lack of systematic interest in democracy. In this work, I focused on arguing that these problematic aspects can be overcome by a comparative reading of Arendt with John Dewey. I conclude that Dewey offers us a more dynamic criterion to decide the line between the private realm and the public realm. Instead of opposing the social to political, Dewey extends the scope of politics by taking every aspects of social life into consideration. The recovery of the public, for him, depends essentially on a distinct understanding of democracy, which is identified to the experience of local community. Keywords: Arendt, Dewey, the public space, the private space, democracy. 5

6 KAPSAYICI VE DEMOKRATİK BİR KAMUSAL ALAN HANNAH ARENDT VE JOHN DEWEY Özet Arendt in siyasetin anlamını ve kamusal alanın kendi üzerine çöküşünden kurtarılmasını özgün bir biçimde yeniden ele alışı bize farklılıkların siyasal yaşama katılım imkânlarının önünü açan ve demokratik bir siyaset üzerine düşünmemiz için kapsayıcı bir çerçeve sunar. Bununla beraber, önümüzde bir takım sorunlar belirir. Arendt kamusal ve özel alan arasında çok keskin bir ayrıma gider, toplumsal ve siyasal arasında ciddi bir karşıtlık görür ve Arendt te demokrasiye karşı sistematik bir ilgi eksikliği ile karşılaşırız. Bu çalışma sözü edilen sorunlu yönlerin John Dewey ve Arendt in bir karşılaştırmalı okuması vasıtasıyla aşılabileceği tartışmasına dayanmaktadır. Dewey kamusal ve özel alan arasında daha hareketli bir ölçüt sunar, siyasetin kapsamını toplumsal yaşamın tüm yönlerini içine alacak şekilde genişletir. Dewey e göre kamusal alanın yeniden tesis edilmesi temel olarak yerel cemaat deneyimiyle özdeşleşmiş özgün bir demokrasi kavrayışına bağlıdır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Arendt, Dewey, kamusal alan, özel alan, demokrasi. 6

7 The cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy. John Dewey Here, the remedy against the irreversibility and unpredictability of the process started by acting does not arise out of another and possibly higher faculty, but is one of the potentialities of action itself. Hannah Arendt Hannah Arendt was one of the most important political thinkers of the twentieth century, and her political thought still provides us a comprehensive perspective to think about our very own century s political issues. Arendt firmly avoids defining herself as a philosopher or a professional thinker (1978, p. 3). In addition, her authentic way of dealing with politics is quite unconventional and challenging. It is, thus, a difficult task to classify her writings in terms of traditional political schools of thought, such as liberalism, communitarianism, conservatism, or socialism (D Entreves, 1993, p. 1). What she endeavors to do is simply to think what we are doing in a new and yet unknown age. Arendt s employment of the term public, as Pitkin underscores, is virtually identical with the political. Nevertheless, Pitkin maintains, political is not to be equated with governmental; instead, it concerns action in a community of peers (1981, p. 328). Arendt s political thought breaks away from the traditional political theories that seek the best form of government and consider politics as a means to acquire it. Rather, her attempt to retrieve the meaning of politics explicitly centers on public freedom. Public freedom, for Arendt, can only spring from the spontaneity of action and requires the public space as its necessary condition. It cannot be identified with any kind of representative mode of government that considers people as subjects and reduces the participation of people to electorship. Now, in contrast to criticisms that improperly classify Arendt s political thought as nostalgic or utopian, I 7

8 will propound that her political philosophy can still shed light on our contemporary political problems, provided that its problematical aspects are dealt with properly by certain critical and complementary approaches. I will divide the problematic aspects of Arendt s political thought into three categories: 1) sharpness of the distinction between the private and public, 2) consistency regarding the antagonism between the social and the political, and 3) if not incomprehensible altogether, a puzzling disbelief in democracy. Then I will argue that these shortcomings can be resolved through a comparative and complementary reading of John Dewey s social and political philosophy, with which Arendt would never be content. Arendt and Dewey concur regarding the apparent eclipse of the public and the necessity of its recovery. On the other hand, they essentially differ in regard to their political philosophies. Dewey offers us a dynamic distinction between the private and the public realm based on the consequences of our interactions. To a certain extent, his dealing with society is compatible with Arendt s. Dewey sees in the rapid transformation of social life an acute disintegration, instability, and loss of belonging. Nevertheless, unlike Arendt, Dewey does not contrast the social with the political. His political philosophy is more inclusive and endeavors to extend the limits of politics into all aspects of social life. This inclusive politics is, for Dewey, possible only when the disintegrated and impersonalized society transforms into a great community, which he calls a community of communities (Bernstein, 2006, p. 196). For him, this transformation is also the condition for the reversing of the eclipse of the public. Democracy, for him, is equated with the experience of community, which refers to face-to-face communication, shared experiences, trust, and mutual respect. 8

9 Arendt was highly critical of Dewey s philosophy and pragmatism in general. Nevertheless, her critical point of view basically depends particularly on a misinterpretation and misreading of Dewey and an indifference towards pragmatism in general. In the very beginning of the Human Condition, Arendt set asides both the traditional conception of truth and the pragmatic assertion. The former is based on revelation and therefore something essentially given to man, while the latter claims that man can know only what he makes himself (Arendt, 1998, p.17). For Arendt, Hildreth states, it is precisely this form of instrumentalization that degrades politics into a mere means (2008, p.6). Moreover, she maintains, we are perhaps the first generation which has become fully aware of the murderous consequences inherent in a line of thought that forces one to admit that all means, provided that they are efficient, are permissible and justified to pursue something defined as an end (qtd. from Hildretht, 2008, p. 6). On the other hand, for Dewey, there is no absolute fixity regarding ends and means. They are dynamically interconnected. He was highly critical of the blind and noxious assertion that ends justify means. Ends and means, he states, have to be viewed and judged on the ground of their actual objective results (Dewey, 2008, p. 362). Therefore, the decision for the choice of means, for him, is grounded in an independent examination of measures and policies with respect to their actual objective consequences (2008, p. 354). Arendt s criticism is not just limited to the reduction of politics to a mere means. In 1946, Arendt published a book review of Dewey s Problems of Men. The title of the review explicitly indicates her criticism: The Ivory Tower of Common Sense. Arendt (1993) asserts, contrary to Dewey s appeal to reality and experience, his philosophy goes astray in its abstract argumentation (p. 194). Arendt (1993) sarcastically satirizes Dewey s failure to comprehend the source of all the social and political evils of our time (p. 194). For her, it is not laissez-faire 9

10 liberalism, as Dewey claimed, but scientific planning that turned the human world into a hell. Then, Arendt underrates Dewey s advocacy of science and education, and his understanding of renascent liberalism that directs social action in a proper way. Arendt s description of Dewey is out of tune with reality and depends on an enormous misinterpretation, which I will try to point out when I take on Dewey s endeavor to grasp the eclipse of the public. Although, there is an apparent discrepancy between Arendt and Dewey in terms of politics and philosophy in general, similarities between them are remarkable. They both concentrated on the eclipse of the public and a constant search for its meaning. In addition, they both advocated a council/ward system, public freedom, and active participation in politics, rather than reducing politics to a profession that belongs to a small group of privileged people. Let us then turn back to the problematic aspects of Arendt s political thought. I will take on her sharp distinctions between the private and the public and between the social and the political together since they are interrelated. At first, it needs to be noted that the sharp distinctions that Arendt makes between both the private and the public and the social and political are thoroughly consistent with her overall political thought insofar as her political theory is understood as an antithesis of the totalitarian plague (Isaac, 2002, p. 505). The eclipse of the public, for her, was a distinct result of the rise of the social, namely, the disappearance of the dividing line between the private and public realm. The experience of totalitarianism clearly evinced that the loss of belonging to a political community resulted not only in homelessness, but also human beings becoming superfluous. Then, Arendt (2005a) underscores, What went wrong is politics, our plural existence, and not what we can do and create insofar as we exist in the singular: in the isolation of the artist, in the solitude of the philosopher, in the inherently worldless relationship between human beings as it exists in love and sometimes in friendship when one heart reaches out directly to the other, as in friendship, or when the in-between, the world, goes up in flames, as in love (p. 220). 10

11 Arendt s basic definition of politics is based on human plurality, taking the perspectives of others into consideration. Politics then centers on human beings existence in plurality, which reveals itself exclusively in action and speech in the presence of others. She used the public space, der öffentliche Raum, interchangeably with the space of appearances where one is seen and heard by others by inserting his or her own perspectives into the world, without falling victim to one-dimensional logic of ideological thinking. Therefore, Arendt s effort to reverse the eclipse of public space, is grounded in her radical and meticulous criticisms of the totalitarian nightmare of her own time. Benhabib (1992) states, for Arendt, totalitarianism has no spatial topology: it is like an iron band, compressing people increasingly together until they are formed into one (p. 92). Arendt s (1998) insistent return to the spatiality of the public also leads us to her significant criticism of traditional western philosophy which operates through certain hierarchical binary distinctions, such as action-contemplation, temporality-eternity, appearance-thing-in-itself, and opinion-truth. She holds, the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all (Ibid. 199). Arendt s interpretation of the ancient concept of δόξα is of great importance in understanding her conception of public space since not only does it point out the agent but also the spectators. The term δόξα has several meanings, such as opinion, glory, reputation, honor, and splendor. Arendt (2005b) holds, To Socrates, as to his fellow citizens, doxa was the formulation in speech of what dokei moi, that is, of what appears to me. This doxa had as its topic comprehension of the world as it opens itself to me. It was not, therefore, subjective fantasy and arbitrariness, but was also not something absolute and valid for all. The assumption was that the world opens up differently to every man according to his position in it; and that the sameness of the world, its commonness or objectivity resides in the fact that the same world opens up to everyone and that despite all differences between men and their positions in the world and consequently their doxai (opinions) both you and I are human (p. 14). 11

12 She maintains that as far as the political realm is concerned both the manifestation of the whoness of the agent and her recognition are only granted within the public sphere. It is overtly presented in Socrates refusal to withdraw from the agora into private life in order to escape being executed. In private life, which Arendt constantly describes as a shadowy interior, in contradistinction to the shining brightness of the public space, one can neither appear nor shine, and consequently no doxa is possible there (2005b, p. 14). For Arendt, earthly immortality, human glory (doxa) takes places only when one appears in the public space by taking initiative to participate in political matters. She holds that the dividing line between the private and the public was lost along with the rise of the social, which basically means the permeation of the private matter into every aspects of political life. In addition, action, which is an essential characteristic of a human being, is replaced by behavior, which depends on sameness, not human plurality. Human plurality reveals itself through one s peculiar differences and diversities. Along with the loss of the meaning of action, human beings are subjects to the laws of statistics and reduced to mere inputs that can be measured, calculated, predicted, and manipulated. These two sharp distinctions, which Arendt makes, between the private and the public and the social and the political, make perfect sense insofar as they are understood as a response to totalitarian experience. Nevertheless, regarding our own time, it is a question both of how to decide upon the dividing line between the private and the public realm and if the exclusion of the social from the political is still sustainable. Let us first begin with the whereabouts of the dividing line between the private and the public. The private, for Arendt, refers to the household (οίκος), and therefore, the family. It needs 12

13 to be excluded from the public space not only for the sake of the political, but also for itself. On the other hand, it becomes evident that this exclusion brings about certain shortcomings, as feminist critics noted it. Benhabib (1992) holds, Questions of justice were from the beginning restricted to the public sphere, whereas the private sphere was considered outside the realm of justice (p. 109). Arendt considers the family anti-political, and therefore she avoids the question of justice within the private realm. On the other hand, in the private realm we encounter multiple oppressions and exploitations based on gender, sexual orientation, and age. In addition, the dividing line cannot be understood as a matter of one s own choice to expose the issues of the private realm in the public space, when the dividing line is ambiguous. To illustrate, most of the abusive men defend themselves by taking sanctuary in the privacy of the family. In addition, in certain countries, law enforcement officers and divorce suit judges at first try to make couples reconcile for the sake of the conservation of the family. Moreover, the family is itself subjected to transformation. A contentious contemporary issue such as same sex marriage, or civil unions, is a good example, and it requires us to reconsider the dividing line between the private and the public anew. Are not these issues political well enough? Do not they deserve to be included in the public space? Indeed, they do. Therefore, we need to look for a more tenable criterion to decide upon the dividing line between the private and the public realm. I will endeavor to show that Dewey provides us a more dynamic and tenable grasping of the problem. The question for him is to find out how an action achieves a public capacity (Dewey, 1991, p. 13). He holds, human acts have consequences upon others (p.12). He maintains that consequences of human actions are divided into two: those which affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, and those which affect others beyond those 13

14 immediately concerned (p. 12). This response indicates the gist of the matter of the dividing line between the private and the public. Regarding the dividing line, Dewey (1991) holds, the question of what transactions should be left as far as possible to voluntary initiative and agreement and what should come under the regulation of the public is a question of time, place and concrete conditions that can be known only by careful observation and reflective investigation (p. 193). Like Arendt, Dewey holds that human actions are unpredictable, but he asserts that, if not completely free from fallibility, they are subject to observation. Moreover, they can be given direction, when a proper method is provided. I will turn back later to the significance of social inquiry and intelligence in Dewey s social and political philosophy. Now, let me take on his approach towards the question of the rise of society. Although Arendt and Dewey depart from different starting points they come to a similar conclusion regarding the rise of society. They both hold that the rise of society gave rise to a prevalent feeling of insecurity and instability and, most importantly, to the eclipse of the public that keeps us together. For Arendt it is scientific planning that made the world become hell, whereas Dewey holds that it is a kind of mental unpreparedness, which indicates a lack of comprehension of the rapid transformation of society. Dewey s approach toward the rise of society, compared to Arendt s more comprehensive analysis, centers on an understanding of the failure of liberalism and its deserting consequences upon social action. On the other hand, Dewey goes beyond Arendt by offering us a framework to think about social change, namely, to think about how to overcome inequalities and oppressions within so called society. Therefore, in reversing the eclipse of the public, the sustainability of Arendt s contrast between the social and political is questionable. On the one hand, Dewey concurs with Arendt: the rise of society, for him, resulted in annihilation of individuality along with the disintegration of social ties. On the 14

15 other, Dewey sees in this process rising struggles for equality, liberty, and justice, since inequalities and injustices become more visible through the rise of society. Thus, the rise of society, for Dewey, as a problem before us, can only be understood and responded to by means of a participatory politics in which all aspects of social life find their voices. Such a participatory politics is, for Dewey, possible through transforming the great society into a great community. However, how this transformation is to be achieved depends on a proper understanding of the issue at hand. It requires us to ask what is going on and how it goes on (Dewey, 1991, p. 21). It is an intellectual problem as well as political. Instead of appealing to reason, which does nothing but justify the adopted opinions, for a peculiar solution, Dewey points out the significance of social inquiry and intelligence. He (2008a) maintains, intelligence is conversion of past experience into knowledge and projection of that knowledge in ideas and purposes that anticipates what may come to be in the future and that indicate how to realize what is desired. Every problem that arises, personal or collective, simple or complex, is solved only by selecting material from the store of knowledge amassed in past experience and by bringing into play habits already formed. But the knowledge and the habits have to be modified to meet the new conditions that have arisen. In collective problems, the habits that are involved are traditions and institutions (p. 37). Dewey is highly critical of politics becoming a profession that destroys the active participation of every member of a political community. Thus, his claim to social inquiry does not mean passing people s right to participate in politics onto experts, since social inquiry is essentially a part of the social process. Moreover, intelligence, for Dewey (2008a) is not an individual possession, but it is the method of directing social action (p. 37). It is a significant part of the process of making and remaking of habit for an equal, stable, and inclusive social and political life. Social intelligence and inquiry, then, for Dewey (1991), corresponds to an essential need, which is the problem of public, namely, the improvement of the methods and 15

16 conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion (p. 208). Eldridge (1998) holds, Dewey was concerned that practice, including political practice, be intelligized. He thought such an intelligized political practice was not constituted merely by winning an election, passing a piece of legislation, or enacting a treaty, but by the development of means and ends through a process of considering the conditions and consequences of a situation that would lead to continued development, particularly of the individuals involved (p. 87). Dewey s conception of social inquiry and intelligence provides us a more inclusive framework to contemplate the procedures that secure the consequences of actions in the realm of politics than Arendt s incomplete conception of judgment. Let us now turn back to our third and final problematic, which is Arendt s disbelief in democracy, along with a comparative and complementary reading of Dewey. While offering a comprehensive political theory that centers on human plurality and active participation that make diversities and differences become visible in the public realm, it is quite perplexing that there is no systematic interest in democracy in Arendt s political theory. On the contrary, as Wolin argues, it is not difficult to show that many of the major categories that compose and distinguish her political outlook were either critical of or incompatible with democratic ideas (1996, p. 546). Democracy requires extending the scope of participation to all aspects of the social realm, which Arendt sees as the cause of the eclipse of the public. Despite the fact that there is a striking critical approach against democracy, it is not completely incompatible with the overall political theory of Arendt for two distinct reasons. First, her political theory basically differs from the traditional political theories that are determined by a search for the best form of government. Instead of the institutional aspects of politics, the main focus of her political theory is essentially grounded in public freedom that springs from spontaneous action. Therefore, it is open to 16

17 question how and by what means Arendt s claim to public freedom and active participation can be legitimized. Secondly, derived from the outcomes of her meticulous investigation of the experience of totalitarianism, democracy is nothing but an illusion insofar as it is understood as the rule by the majority. The fact of totalitarian experiences, for Arendt, put an end to the assumption of the active participation by the majority. For her, the majority of people is politically neutral and indifferent, and as a matter of fact these indifferent masses are of no importance, since they are no more than the inarticulate backward setting for the political life of the nation (Arendt, 1966, p. 312). Moreover, Arendt holds, as long as democracy is understood as the rule by a majority, it rests on the silent approbation and tolerance of the indifferent and inarticulate sections of the people (Ibid). However, we still encounter a significant change regarding participatory democracy and institutional aspects of politics in Arendt s late period. This change is well expressed in her On Revolution and Crises of Republic where she acknowledges the revolutionary spirit of tradition, by concentrating particularly on the Jeffersonian ward system, or township meetings, and its peculiar claim to public freedom in general. Through these self-governing political communities, we are provided a tangible example of how the public space ought to be established to give rise to public freedom and active participation in political matters in the presence of fellow citizens. For Arendt, it is manifested by American revolutionaries that public freedom is not an inner experience of a human being in her singularity or cannot be understood by means of freedom of will. It is then essentially interwoven with the public space. She holds, freedom could exist only in public; it was a tangible, worldly reality, something created by men to be enjoyed by men rather than a gift or a capacity, it was the man-made public space or market-place which antiquity had known as the area where freedom appears and becomes visible to all (Arendt, 2006, p. 115). 17

18 Arendt s resort to the council system is of great significance to indicate both her advocacy of participatory democracy and her critical approach against the understanding of democracy as the rule by the majority. Arendt (1972a) states, We [councils] want to participate, we want to debate, we want to make our voices heard in public, and we want to have a possibility to determine the political course of our country. Since the country is too big for all of us to come together and determine our fate, we need a number of public spaces within it. The booth in which we deposit our ballots is unquestionably too small, for this booth has room for only one. The parties are completely unsuitable, there we are, most of us, nothing but the manipulated electorate. But if only ten of us are sitting around a table, each expressing his opinion, each hearing the opinion of others, then a rational formation of opinion can take through the exchange of opinions (p ). Nevertheless, Arendt is very suspicious about the realization of a council-state, in which power is formed horizontally as a web of distinct, small republics. What makes the totalitarian movements possible is, for Arendt, the fact that they rest on sheer force of numbers (1966, p. 311). She maintains that in small populated countries totalitarian movements would almost have no chance to take place. In her later work, On Violence, Arendt turns back to her assertion of limited population regarding bringing into existence a new example, and she writes, it will have a chance, if at all, in a small country, or in small, well-defined sectors in the mass societies of the large powers (1972b, p. 181). Unlike Arendt s late and still cautious approach towards democracy, the idea of democracy and its realization are of paramount importance in Dewey, not only in his social and political philosophy, but also in his overall philosophy. However, Dewey s conception of democracy differs significantly from the traditional conception of democracy as it is understood in terms of a form of government ruled by the majority. Leaving the formal grasping of democracy aside makes it clear that its problems cannot be understood and recovered by 18

19 inventing more mechanical apparatus. Then, Dewey (2008b) asserts that democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature (p. 227). Here arises a more inclusive conception of democracy. Dewey (2008c) holds, A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity (p. 94). For Dewey, the realization of democracy as such depends on its permeating into all aspects of life such as the family, the school, industry, religion, and education, by allowing all the members of a political community to take their part in politics without anyone being excluded based on race, gender, age, ethnicity, culture, and so on. For an inclusive grasping of democracy, it is then necessary to go beyond its formal conception. In addition to leaving aside the formal conception of democracy, one needs to take a step further by eliminating the understanding of democracy as a mechanism of majority rule, or simply put, counting of heads. Such an understanding of democracy brings about a significant problem, namely, the problem of the oppression of minorities by coercive force. Democracy as a way of life enables individuals to take part in the formation of shared experiences not by succumbing to the coercive force of the majority, but by becoming visible through their own individual differences and diversities by means of persuasion, debate, and discussion. The idea of social change is of a great importance in Dewey s social and political philosophy. Nevertheless, Dewey was very critical about radicalism and reactionary political theories and movements regarding social change. Dewey strongly advocates social change by means of democracy, not by means of violence. Dewey (2008d) holds, 19

20 The end of democracy is a radical end. For it is an end that has not been adequately realized in any country at any time. It is radical because it requires great change in existing social institutions, economic, legal, and cultural. A democratic liberalism that does not recognize these things in thought and action is not awake to its own meaning and to what that meaning demands (p. 299). Like Arendt, Dewey s constant interest in democracy originated in an essential analysis of a contemporary phenomenon, that is, the eclipse of the public. American democracy, for Dewey, springs from the experience of local community and the eclipse of the public is a result of dislocation and unsettlement of this genuine experience of community life (1991,p. 212). Identification of democracy with the experience of communal life is a central theme in Dewey s social and political philosophy. Dewey s analysis of the eclipse of the public to some extend concurs with the communitarian critique of loss of being together; however, it must be noted that Dewey s understanding of community differs basically from the conventional understanding of the idea of community, contrasted with the loosely organized society and identified with collective identity, memory, and action, as if there is no room for the individual. For Dewey local community is to be understood as a fundamental form of democracy. The possible misreading and misunderstanding of Dewey s reference to the community is essentially due to the ambiguity inherent in the conception of community. One the one hand, it represents intimate relationships based on mutual trust and respect. On the other, there is always a possibility of oppression of the differences for the sake of the whole. For Dewey, community is understood as a distinct model for the public space in which an individual not only gives but also takes, enjoys the equal opportunity of participation and freedom of releasing her full energies. Contrary to Arendt s antagonizing of individual with citizen, for Dewey (2008e), an individual is a distinct part of political life. An individual, Dewey holds, is not an isolated non-social atoms (p. 232). Nor is it understood numerically. Dewey rejects the assumption which is based an understanding 20

21 of the individual in contrast to the social. Nor can individuality be equated to the private economical profit, which is, for Dewey (2008f), the essential failure of older individualism (p. 76). An individual cannot be thought outside the social context. For Dewey, an individual, be a singular human being or a thing, does not act in isolation, but act together. For him, an adequate conception of an individual requires us to consider not only its connections and ties, but the consequences with respect to which it acts and moves (1991, p. 187). In Dewey we find a genuine synthesis of communitarian and liberal approaches. For Dewey, communitarianism and liberalism, Bernstein holds, are not incompatible with each other, but, he maintains, they are mutually interdependent (2010, p. 299). If by liberalism, one understands, in contrast with the anti-historic and atomistic theory of individualism of the earlier liberalism, not a right to have private property but a claim to social intelligence rooted in freedom of thought, expression, and communication, Dewey can be considered as a liberal. On the other hand, if one sticks with the traditional notion of liberalism, which is determined by a limited and a-historical approach, namely, a reduction of liberty to free economic enterprise and no government restriction or social control, by no means can Dewey be classified under this category. It is, for Dewey, this reductionism that marks the bankruptcy of old liberalism. Dewey (2008a) holds, in contrast with purely formal or legal liberty, effective liberty is a function of the social conditions existing at any time (p. 27). Therefore, Dewey s claim to the local communities as a necessary condition for a democratically established public is not a mere nostalgia, but a distinct approach that requires a systematic and continuous endeavor to inquire into the conditions for the possibilities of an articulate public. For Dewey, local communities, as a distinct model for the recovery of the eclipse of the public, fulfills the basic requirements of an inclusive democracy by means of face to face communication, interaction, and active 21

22 participation. Dewey holds, democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community (1991, p. 213). Despite the fact that Dewey s appeal to democracy as a radical idea which has not yet realized seems to run parallel to Arendt s suspicion regarding the realization of the small republics in a largely populated countries, Dewey sees, through these peculiar web of communities, the possibility of a national and international foundation for democracy. In Arendt, we find a very sharp distinction between the private-public, social-political, or individual-citizen. Based on these sharp distinctions, Arendt labels the first components as a- political or anti-political, and leaves them out of the scope of politics. Therefore, her inflexible approach makes it difficult to figure out certain workable solutions regarding our contemporary political problems. However, the non-absolutist or non-ideological characteristic of her political theory, her definition of politics as human plurality, her insightful analysis of the experience of totalitarianism, both in its actuality and the possibility of its reappearance, still provides us a significant framework to think about the meaning of politics, public freedom, and active participation. I endeavored to show that the problematic aspects of Arendt s political theory can be eliminated by a comparative and complementary reading of Dewey. For, Dewey offers us a more dynamical conception of the private and the public, a more inclusive grasping of the public space by extending its scope to all aspects of social life, and, finally, a systematic and continuous faith in democracy. 22

23 BIBLIOGRAPHY Arendt, Hannah. (1966). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.. (1972a). "Thoughts on Politics and Revolution: A Commentary." In Crisis of the Republic, New York: Hacourt, Brace, and Jovanovich.. (1972b)"On Violence." In Crisis of the Republic, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich Inc.. (1978) The Life of the Mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.. (1993)."The Ivory Tower of Common Sense." In Essays in Understanding, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.. (1998). The Human Condition. Second Edition. Edited by Introduction by Margret Canovan. Chicago: The University Press of Chicago.. (2005a). "Intoduction into Politics." In The Promise of Politics, edited by Jerome Kohn, New York: Schocken Books.. (2005b). "Socrates." In The Promise of Politics, New York : Schocken Books.. (2006). On Revolution. New York: Penguin Books. Benhabib, Seyla. (1992). Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge. Bernstein, Richard J. (2006). "Creative Democracy -The Task Before Us." In The Pragmatic Century: Conversation with Richard J. Bernstein, edited by Sheila Greeve Davaney and Warren G. Frisina. New York, Albany: State University of New York Press.. (2010). "Dewey's Vision of Radical Democracy." In The Cambridge Companion to Dewey, edited by Molly Cochran, New York: Cambridge University Press. d'entreves, Maurizio Paaserin. (1993). The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt. New York: Routledge. Dewey, John. (1991). The Public and its Problems. Athens: Swallow Press, Ohio University Press. 23

24 . (2008a) "Liberalism and Social Action." In In The Collected Works of John Dewey, The Later Works, , Vol. 11: , edited by Jo Ann Boydston and with an introdcution by John J. McDermott, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.. (2008b). "Creative Democracy- The Task before Us." In The Collected Works of John Dewey, The Later Works, , Volume 14: , edited by Jo Ann Boydston and with an introduction by R. W.Sleeper Sleeper, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.. (2008c). "Democracy and Education." In The Collected Works of John Dewey, The Middle Works, , Volume 9: 1916,, edited by Jo Ann Boydston and with an indtroduction by Sidney Hook, Carbondale: Suthern Illinois University Press.. (2008d). "Democracy is Radical." In The Collected Works of John Dewey, The Later Works, , Volume 11: , edited by Jo Ann Boydston and with an introduction by John J. McDermott, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.. (2008e). "The Ethics of Democracy." In The Collected Works of John Dewey, The Early Works, , Volume 1: , edited by Jo Ann Boydston and with an introduction by Lewis E. Hahn, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.. (2008f). "Individualism, Old and New." In The Collected Works of John Dewey,The Later Works, , Volume 5: , edited by Jo Ann Boydston and with an introduction by Paul Kurtz, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Eldridge, Michael. (1998). Transforming Experience: John Dewey's Cultural Instrumentalism. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. Hildreth, Roudy W. (2008). "Unlikely Allies: John Dewey and Hannah Arendt on the Renewal of the Public." Paper presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Association for Political Theory, Middletown, CT, October 9-11, Isaac, Jeffrey C. (2002). "Hannah Arendt on Human Rights and the Limits of Exposure or Why Noam Chomsky is Wrong about the Meaning of Kosovo." Social Research 69, no. 2 (Summer):

25 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. (1981). "Justice: On Relating Private and Public." Poilitical Theory, no. 9, Wolin, Sheldon S. (1996). "Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the Political." In Salmagundi Reader, New York: Syracuse University Press. 25

26 BEAUVOIR, CANDIDE İN BAHÇESİNDE Yrd. Doç. Deniz SOYSAL Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Bölümü Özet Candide in ünlü bitiş cümlesi olan kendi bahçemizi ekip biçelim, öğüdüne ilişkin farklı değerlendirmeler vardır. Böylesi etkili bir eserin tartışma yaratan bu son öğüdüne ilişkin yorumlar değerlendirdikten sonra Simone de Beavoir in değerlendirmesi varoluşçu felsefenin temel nitelikleriyle örtüşen bazı önemli tespitler sunmaktadır. Aslında temel bir felsefi sorunun etrafından dönen bu tartışmalar insanın dünyadaki yeriyle ilgili yeni bir bakış açısının tohumlarını içermektedir. Sabahattin Ali nin İçimizdeki Şeytan romanı da aynı soru etrafında dönerek varoluşçu edebiyatın bir örneği olarak incelendiğinde bize Beauvoir nın yorumunu destekleyen yorumlar sunmaktadır. Anahtar Sözcükler: Candide, Voltaire, Beauvoir, varoluşçuluk, etik, İçimizdeki Şeytan BEAUVOIR IN CANDIDE S GARDEN Abstract There are different evaluations for the advice of the famous closing sentence of Candide, let us cultivate our garden. After evaluating these different views Simone de Beauvoir s evaluation presents important assessments that coincide with the basic characteristics of existentialist philosophy. In fact these disputes centering around a basic philosophical problem contain seeds of a new viewpoint about the place of human being in the world. When we 26

27 investigate the novel, İçimizdeki Şeytan, of Sabahattin Ali as an example of existentialist literature, which turns around the same question, it gives us interpretations that support Beauvoir s evaluations. Keywords: Candide, Voltaire, Beauvoir, existentialism, ethics, İçimizdeki Şeytan * 19. yüzyılda psikolojide yaşanan büyük gelişmeler ve 20. yüzyılda analitik felsefenin etkili oluşuyla insanın mutluluğu ve aynı zamanda acıları felsefede daha az ilgilenilen konular haline geldi. Öte yandan fenomenoloji, varoluşçuluk, Frankfurt Okulu ve post-modernizm gibi daha çok Kıta Avrupası kökenli akımlarsa az ya da çok dozlarda insanın yaşama, yaşamın acı ve mutluluklarına, insan varoluşunun kırılgan yapısına değinmekte, bunları konu edinmekte çekingen davranmadılar. Marcuse, Freud üzerine felsefi bir inceleme yazmaktan çekinmedi, Derrida ise Marx ın hayaletlerini kovalamaktan. Toplumun sosyolojiye ve siyaset bilimine, insan ruhunun ya da iç dünyasının da psikolojiye terkedilmesine göz yummayan çoğunlukla Kıta Avrupası filozofları oldu. Belki de bu filozofların psikoloji, sosyoloji, siyaset bilimi, ekonomi, dilbilim, arkeoloji gibi diğer bilimlerin bulguları ve akıl yürütmeleri ile içiçe çalışmaları bilginin parçalara ayrılıp nasıl ve hangi tavırla yaşama yöneleceğimize ilişkin bütüncül soruyu rafa kaldırmamıza bir tepkiydi. Felsefenin sonu ilan edilmeye çalışılırken, tam da şimdi taze ve büsbütün yeni bilgi ve yaratımlarla karşı karşıyayken felsefeye, filozofun değerlendirmesine ihtiyacımız olduğunu kabullenmekte zorlanıyoruz. Ya da belki felsefe eskisinden daha zor hale geldiğinden, filozof olmak daha büyük bir donanım, daha büyük bir deha ve daha büyük bir moral gerektirdiğinden felsefenin sonunu ilan etmek tembel insana en kolay yolmuş gibi göründü. Sartre öldüğünde Fransız halkı artık kim bize yol gösterecek diye kara kara düşünmeye başladığında yaşamını tümüyle doğru düşünmeye, doğru hissetmeye, doğru yazmaya, 27