Üreten, Armağan. Turkish pharmaceutical industry and restructuring of the sector with fusions. İstanbul: Yeditepe Üniversitesi, 2003.

Transkript

1 2200 OOCCAAKK ÇÇAARRŞŞAAMBBAA SSAAYYI II: : Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Üreten, Armağan. Turkish pharmaceutical industry and restructuring of the sector with fusions. İstanbul: Yeditepe Üniversitesi, İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1

2 Resmi Gazete YASAMA BÖLÜMÜ TBMM KARARLARI 953 Deprem Riskinin Araştırılarak Deprem Yönetiminde Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Bir Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu Kurulmasına İlişkin Karar 954 Madencilik Sektöründeki Sorunların Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırması Komisyonuna Üye Seçimine İlişkin Karar YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Adalet Bakanlığına, Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Cemil ÇİÇEK in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere Milli Eğitim Bakanlığına, Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanı Mehmet Mehdi EKER in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığına, Çevre ve Orman Bakanı Veysel EROĞLU nun Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere YÖNETMELİKLER Gıda ve Yem Amaçlı Genetik Yapısı Değiştirilmiş Organizmalar ve Ürünlerinin İthalatı, İşlenmesi, İhracatı, Kontrol ve Denetimine Dair Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Gazi Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Enstitüsü Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Gazi Üniversitesi Karayolu Ulaştırması Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi Yönetmeliği Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik TEBLİĞLER Yapı Malzemeleri Yönetmeliği (89/106/EEC) Kapsamında Uygulanacak Teknik Şartnamelerin Yayımlanması Hakkında Tebliğde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Tebliğ (No: YİG/2010/01) Çek Defterlerinin Baskı Şekline, Bankaların Hamile Ödemekle Yükümlü Olduğu Miktar ile Çek Düzenleme ve Çek Hesabı Açma Yasağı Kararlarının Bildirilmesine ve Duyurulmasına İlişkin Tebliğ (Sayı: 2010/2) Marka Tescil Başvurularına Ait Mal ve Hizmetlerin Sınıflandırılmasına İlişkin Tebliğde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Tebliğ (BİK/TPE: 2010/2) YARGI BÖLÜMÜ YÜKSEK SEÇİM KURULU KARARLARI Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun 14/1/2010 Tarihli ve 17 Sayılı Kararı Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun 14/1/2010 Tarihli ve 18 Sayılı Kararı Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun 16/1/2010 Tarihli ve 22 Sayılı Kararı Yabancı Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Volume 29, Issue 1, Pages 1-98 (January-February 2010) Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China Pages 1-26 Joseph Aharony, Jiwei Wang, Hongqi Yuan İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2

3 Using a sample of 185 Chinese IPO firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period , we show that related-party (RP) sales of goods and services could be used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-ipo period. We also provide evidence that such behavior may be motivated by the prospect of tunneling opportunities in the post-ipo period, i.e., exploiting economic resources from minority shareholders for the benefit of the parent company. We provide evidence of one such opportunistic tunneling tool: non-repayment by Chinese parent companies of net outstanding corporate loans made to them by their newly listed subsidiaries. Furthermore, we provide evidence in support of our assertion of an association between such tunneling behavior in the post-ipo period and earnings management via abnormal RP sales in the pre-ipo period. Finally, we demonstrate the apparent failure of investors in Chinese IPOs to perceive the link between the two phenomena. The results enhance understanding of the motives for and consequences of earnings manipulation during the IPO process. They highlight a potential additional investment risk facing foreign investors in China s capital markets as well as in Chinese firms cross-listed in non- Chinese stock exchanges, and have policy implications for China and other emerging markets which need to improve the protection of minority shareholders rights. 1. Introduction 2. Institutional background 3. Prior research, incremental contribution and hypotheses 4. Data and univariate analysis 4.1. Univariate analysis of earnings management variables 4.2. Univariate analysis of tunneling variables 5. Methodology and analysis 5.1. Assessing earning management during the IPO process 5.2. Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process 5.3. Do investors perceive opportunistic RPTs? A post-ipo test of the implications of tunneling for capital markets 6. Conclusion İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3

4 Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements Pages Adam Kolasinski, Xu Li We find that insiders trade as if they exploit market underreaction to earnings news, buying (selling) after good (bad) earnings announcements when the price reaction to the announcement is low (high). We also find that insider trades attributable to public information about earnings and the price reaction generate abnormal returns. By demonstrating that managers spot market underreaction to earnings news, our results imply that managers are savvy about their company s stock price. 1. Introduction 2. Discussion of hypotheses 3. Sample, data, and research design 3.1. Sample and data 3.2. Measures of insider trading, earnings and stock returns 3.3. Testing the insider awareness hypothesis (H1) 3.4. Tests of the insider returns hypothesis (H2) 4. Results 4.1. Descriptive statistics 4.2. Hypothesis test results The insider awareness hypothesis (H1) The insider returns hypothesis (H2) 5. Sensitivity analyses 5.1. Specification 5.2. Alternate variable definitions and other robustness checks İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4

5 6. Conclusion Joint selection of balanced scorecard targets and weights in a collaborative setting Pages Hemantha S.B. Herath, Wayne G. Bremser, Jacob G. Birnberg Information asymmetries may create problems in developing both the balanced scorecard (BSC) targets and weights. In practice, the process of assigning weights to performance measures can be challenging in terms of reaching a consensus between top management and divisional managers. In this research, we address the issues of target and weight selection using a collaborative decisionmaking model. Most of the previous research related to performance measurement has assumed selfinterested agents. When weights are assigned subjectively, there is evidence in the literature of common-measure bias leading to BSC disagreement (conflict). We contribute to the literature by considering actor preferences in a novel approach that permits the parties jointly to determine optimal (or approximately optimal) BSC targets and weights. 1. Introduction 2. Motivation 3. Review of relevant literature 4. Mathematical programming models of joint BSC target and weight selection 4.1. Applicability of FOTE assumption 4.2. The model Definition of terms and variables Decision variables Parameters and constants Determining extreme efficient contracts-dealing from the top Model 1: maximizing the sum of the payoffs İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5

6 Model 2: maximizing the product of the excesses Model 3: maximizing the minimum proportion of potential 5. Numerical example 5.1. Numerical example setup 5.2. Solution to BSC Model 1 maximize the sum of the payoffs 5.3. Solution to BSC Model 2 maximize the product of excesses 5.4. Solution to BSC Model 3 maximize the minimum of proportion of potential (POP)) 5.5. Analysis of solutions 6. Discussion Acknowledgements The effects of advertising and solicitation on audit fees Pages David Hay, W. Robert Knechel Leading academic and professional accountants have suggested that the crisis in auditing over the past few years may have had its origin in deregulation which allowed firms to advertise their services and solicit new clients, encouraging accounting firms to become more commercial. In this paper, we look at this issue in New Zealand which has the unique distinction of having separated two key forms of deregulation, namely advertising and solicitation, by 6 years. This allows us to separately examine the effect of each form of market competition on audit fees. We find that advertising is associated with increases in fees, not decreases, which suggests that quality-based advertising took place, and not price-based advertising. In contrast, solicitation corresponded with a general decrease in average fees for clients of the Big 8. We interpret this result as indicating an increase in competition among accounting firms. Our results suggest that there may be a much more complex relationship among market competition, advertising and solicitation, and fees than the arguments used to originally justify deregulation. İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6

7 1. Introduction 2. Deregulation of audit markets and audit fees 2.1. Deregulation of advertising 2.2. Deregulation of solicitation 3. Research method and data 4. Results 4.1. Annual fee models 4.2. Analysis of hypotheses using pooled model 4.3. Overall tests of changes after each deregulatory measure 4.4. Tests of auditor switches 4.5. Supplemental analyses: other explanations for changes in audit fees Effect of macroeconomic forces Effect of client size Effect of changes in the profession Effect of litigation risk 5. Summary and conclusion Acknowledgements Appendix A Strategic revenue recognition to achieve earnings benchmarks Pages Marcus L. Caylor I examine whether managers use discretion in revenue recognition to avoid three earnings benchmarks. I find that managers use discretion in both accrued revenue (i.e., accounts receivable) and İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7

8 deferred revenue (i.e., advances from customers) to avoid negative earnings surprises, but find little evidence that discretion is used to avoid losses or earnings decreases. For a common sample of firms with both deferred revenue and accounts receivable, I find evidence that managers do not prefer to exercise discretion in either account. However, further tests show that managers preferred to use discretion in deferred revenue before the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 went into effect, consistent with them choosing to manage an account with the lowest real costs to the firm (i.e., future cash consequences). My results suggest that the revenue recognition joint project undertaken by the FASB and IASB to reduce managerial estimation in revenue recognition may have the unintended consequence of leading to greater real costs imposed on shareholders as firms are likely to use even greater discretion in accounts receivable. 1. Introduction 2. Hypotheses development 3. Sample selection and research design 3.1. Sample selection 3.2. Modeling normal changes in gross accounts receivable 3.3. Modeling normal changes in deferred revenue 3.4. Models to test hypotheses 4. Results 4.1. Descriptive evidence 4.2. Earnings benchmark results 4.3. Do managers express a preference for revenue management? 5. Conclusions and Implications Acknowledgements İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8