Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

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1 1188 MAARRTT ÇÇAARRŞŞAAMBBAA SSAAYYI II: : Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Kerimoğlu, Ali. Transfer fiyatlandırması yoluyla örtülü kazanç dağıtımı (Yüksek Lisans Tezi). İstanbul: Kadir Has Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, ÖZ Dört bölümden oluşan çalışmanın birinci bölümünde, transfer fiyatlandırması ile ilgili kavramlar ve açıklamalardan bahsedilerek dünya ülkelerinde transfer fiyatlandırması modelleri ve konuyla ilgili OECD raporları incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde, transfer fiyatlandırmasının Türk vergi sistemine girişi, ilişkili kişi kapsamına giren hususlar ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca emsallere uygunluk ilkesi, karşılaştırma analizi, hazine zararı ve gayri maddi hak kavramları incelenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde, transfer fiyatlandırması ölçüm modelleri ve modellerin uygulanışına ilişkin örnekler yer almaktadır. Dördüncü bölümde ise, transfer fiyatlandırmasının artı ve eksileri ortaya konarak uygulamaya ilişkin yorumlara yer verilmiştir. İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1

2 Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ MİLLETLER ARASI ANDLAŞMALAR 2009/14688 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Kosova Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Karşılıklı Vize Muafiyeti Anlaşması nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/14689 Türkiye-Vietnam Karma Ekonomik ve Ticaret Komitesi Dördüncü Dönem Toplantısı Mutabakat Zaptı nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/14691 Türk-Moğol Karma Ekonomik ve Ticaret Komitesi V. Dönem Toplantısı Protokolü nün Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/14719 Türkiye-Belarus Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik Komisyonu Altıncı Dönem Toplantısı Protokolu nun Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/14752 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Yemen Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Büyükelçilik ve Rezidans Binalarının İnşası İçin Arsa Takasına İlişkin Anlaşma nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/14761 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Fas Krallığı Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Su Alanında Teknik İşbirliği Anlaşması nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/14762 Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği (KEİ) Örgütü Üyesi Devletlerin Vatandaşı İşadamları İçin Vize İşlemlerinin Basitleştirilmesi Anlaşması ile Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği (KEİ) Örgütü Üyesi Devletlerin Vatandaşı Profesyonel Kamyon Sürücüleri İçin Vize İşlemlerinin Basitleştirilmesi Anlaşması nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar TEBLİĞLER Ön Ödeme Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Genel Tebliğde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Tebliğ (Sayı: 2009/1) Tekstil Teknik Komitesinin Oluşumu ve Görevlerine Dair Tebliğde Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Tebliğ (No: SGM/2009-3) Ayakkabı Teknik Komitesinin Oluşumu ve Görevlerine Dair Tebliğde Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Tebliğ (No: SGM/2009-4) Dış Ticarette Standardizasyon Tebliği (No: 2009/25) Elma İhracatında İhracat İadesi Yardımı Yapılmasına İlişkin Tebliğ (No: 2009/2) YARGI BÖLÜMÜ ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ KARARLARI Anayasa Mahkemesinin E: 2007/105, K: 2008/75 Sayılı Kararı (9/11/2007 Tarihli ve 5710 Sayılı Kanun ile İlgili) Anayasa Mahkemesinin E: 2004/83, K: 2008/107 Sayılı Kararı (30/6/2004 Tarihli ve 5204 Sayılı Kanun ile İlgili) Anayasa Mahkemesinin E: 2008/42, K: 2008/167 Sayılı Kararı (22/4/1983 Tarihli ve 2820 Sayılı Kanun ile İlgili) Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Volume 25, Issue 4, Pages (July-August 2006) The effect of directors equity incentives on earnings management Pages Joshua Ronen, Joseph Tzur, Varda (Lewinstein) Yari Abstract This study examines the effect of allowing directors to trade in a firm s shares on the likelihood of earnings management, on the firm s value, and on the stock price. We study these issues in a stylized principal-agent game wherein the directors induce earnings management by allowing managers flexibility in reporting. In contrast to Stein [Stein, J.C., Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (4), ], we show that İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2

3 earnings management distorts the stock price because the market cannot undo the bias in the accounting report. Furthermore, it reduces the firm s value because of its unfavorable effect on the manager s effort. These results stand in contrast to the previous literature on insider trading and have important policy implications. They support the OECD s 2004 recommendation to prohibit insider trading. 1. Introduction 2. Model 3. The equilibrium 3.1. Benchmark: the shareholders optimal contract for management 3.2. Benchmark: the optimal contract designed by directors who are not awarded an equity stake 3.3. The equilibrium when directors own equity 4. Example 5. Conclusion Acknowledgements Appendix A. Appendix Virtual integration costs and the limits of supply chain scalability Pages Alnoor Bhimani, Mthuli Ncube Abstract Some enterprises adopt highly vertically integrated structures to carry out essential value chain activities whilst others derive economic benefits from adopting extended structures using Internet-based technologies and through the effective integration of supplier relationships. Extended supply chain alliances can enable low operating/production costs as each partner firm specialises in defined core functions. Such benefits however have to be weighed against the necessary investments in financial and management information systems to enable activities undertaken by supply chain partners to be properly controlled and coordinated. As inter-enterprise İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3

4 activities grow in size and complexity, information system and electronic linkage costs also increase due to possible system incompatibilities with prospective suppliers, the need to meet regulatory compliance requisites, the increased probability of system breakdowns as connection points with suppliers increase and security assurance measures over cross-enterprise information networks. These virtual integration (VI) costs will be low when few suppliers are linked to the extending enterprise. Once a certain level of VI complexity is achieved, the further scalability of supply chain integration will no longer prove cost effective. When this threshold point is reached, it will be preferable for a firm to cease further VI. In fact VI costs can increase even without further supply chain extension due to changing technical risks, application difficulties or environmental turbulence and it may then be worthwhile for the firm to scale back to a higher degree of vertical integration. This paper develops a real options based model to demonstrate the VI linked cost/benefit dynamics of enterprise extension and provides a numerical illustration of the relationships captured by the model. The model extends our knowledge of factors which render extended structures stable rather than transient enterprise forms. 1. Introduction 2. Risk types and options for systems integration 3. Timing options and integration strategies 3.1. The impact of a single cost reduction event 3.2. Supply chain effects 4. The optimal timing for virtual supply extension: A numerical example 5. The decision to abandon further virtual integration 6. The infinite horizon scenario 7. Conclusion Acknowledgements Corporate governance and firm valuation Pages Lawrence D. Brown, Marcus L. Caylor İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4

5 Abstract Gompers et al. [Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, ] created G-Index, a summary measure of corporate governance based on 24 firm-specific provisions, and showed that more democratic firms are more valuable. Bebchuk et al. [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., Ferrell, A., What matters in corporate governance? Working Paper, Harvard Law School] created an entrenchment index based on six provisions underlying G-Index, and found it to fully drive the Gompers et al. (2003) valuation results. Both G-Index and the entrenchment index are based on IRRC data that is comprised of anti-takeover measures, focusing on external governance [Cremers, K.J.M., Nair, V.B., Governance mechanisms and equity prices. Journal of Finance 60, ]. We create Gov-Score, a summary governance measure based on 51 firm-specific provisions representing both internal and external governance, and we show that a parsimonious index based on seven provisions underlying Gov-Score fully drives the relation between Gov-Score and firm value. Our results support the Bebchuk et al. (2005) findings that only a small subset of provisions marketed by corporate governance data providers are related to firm valuation, and the Cremers and Nair (2005) evidence that both internal and external governance are linked to firm value. The 51 governance provisions we consider include five that are relevant to accounting and public policy: stock option expensing, and four that are audit-related. We find none of these five measures to be related to firm valuation. We document that only one of the seven governance provisions important for firm valuation was mandated by either the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 or the three major US stock exchanges. We provide researchers with an alternative measure of governance to G-Index with three distinct advantages: (1) broader in scope of governance, (2) covers more firms, and (3) more dynamic, reflecting recent changes in the corporate governance environment. 1. Introduction 2. Review of related research 3. Data and methodology 3.1. Sample selection İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5

6 3.2. Methodology 4. Firm valuation and Gov-Score 5. Which factors drive the relation between firm valuation and Gov-Score? 5.1. ALL approach 5.2. BCF approach 5.3. STEP approach 6. Parsimonious index fully driving the link between firm value and Gov-Score 7. Additional analyses 7.1. Other years 7.2. Endogeneity 7.3. Gov-Score versus entrenchment index 8. Discussion 9. Summary Appendix. Minimally acceptable corporate governance standards based on ISS Corporate Governance: Best Practices User Guide and Glossary, 2003 Quantum information and accounting information: Their salient features and conceptual applications Pages Joel S. Demski, Stephen A. FitzGerald, Yuji Ijiri, Yumi Ijiri, Haijin Lin Abstract In an interdisciplinary effort, we explore the field of quantum information to search for promising conceptual applications to accounting. Salient features of quantum information are reviewed along with methods associated with the discipline. We then draw parallels to double-entry information through a discussion of the work of mathematician Arthur Cayley. We note that accounting information is a broader concept than double-entry information, and we identify some conceptual applications of quantum information to accounting, aiming to integrate the measurement process and its interactions with the environment. 0. Introduction İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6

7 1. Understanding quantum information 1.1. Salient features of quantum information Quantum superposition and quantum parallel processing Irreducible randomness, inexhaustible uncertainty, and inexplicable probability amplitude Quantum entanglement and quantum teleportation Quantum cryptography and the discovery of unbreakable keys 1.2. Research methods and research emphases in quantum information Making quantum phenomena visible with a Bose-Einstein condensate Quantum algorithms by Shor, Grover, and others An insightful way to think about the fundamental laws of physics Stretching the domain without damaging the classical interpretation Emphasis on causality of events Coping with a paradigm shift such as quantum entanglement 2. Quantum information and mathematical structure of double-entry systems 2.1. Salient features of the classical double-entry information channel Double-entry vs. single-entry information Mathematical structure: comparing ratio matrix and double-entry matrix Equivalents exchange additive and multiplicative inferences The power of the equivalents-exchange rule 2.2. Symbiotic relationship between quantum information and double-entry information Information threads Thick parallel threads in double-entry information for better connectivity 3. Quantum information and accounting information 3.1. Endogeneity issues in accounting information Recognition and aggregation Measurement vs. information content schools Physical vs. social sciences perspective 3.2. Conceptual applications of quantum information to accounting information Uncertainty and probability assessment Endogenous expectation Error-correction mechanism Environment 3.3. Closing remarks: in search for more concrete fundamentals in accounting İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7

8 Necessity of fundamentals Integration with the past In closing, a word of caution Acknowledgements Fair-value accounting: A cautionary tale from Enron Pages George J. Benston Abstract The FASB s 2004 Exposure Draft, Fair-Value Measurements, would have companies determine fair values by reference to market prices on the same assets (level 1), similar assets (level 2) and, where these prices are not available or appropriate, present value and other internally generated estimated values (level 3). Enron extensively used level three estimates and, in some instances, level 2 estimates, for its external and internal reporting. A description of it s use and misuse of fair-value accounting should provide some insights into the problems that auditors and financial statement users might face when companies use level 2 and, more importantly, level 3 fair valuations. Enron first used level 3 fair-value accounting for energy contracts, then for trading activities generally and undertakings designated as merchant investments. Simultaneously, these fair values were used to evaluate and compensate senior employees. Enron s accountants (with Andersen s approval) used accounting devices to report cash flow from operations rather than financing and to otherwise cover up fair-value overstatements and losses on projects undertaken by managers whose compensation was based on fair values. Based on a chronologically ordered analysis of its activities and investments, I believe that Enron s use of fair-value accounting is substantially responsible for its demise. 1. Introduction 2. Enron s adoption and use of fair-value accounting 2.1. Energy contracts İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8

9 2.2. Energy production facilities 2.3. Merchant investments 2.4. Dabhol, other Enron International projects, and Azurix 2.5. Energy management contracts 2.6. Enron broadband services 2.7. Braveheart partnership with Blockbuster 2.8. Derivatives trading 3. Management compensation, expenses, and fair-value accounting 4. Cash flow and fair-value-determined net income 5. Auditors validation of Enron s fair-value accounting 6. Conclusions A test of the loan prohibition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Are firms that grant loans to executives more likely to misstate their financial results? Pages Charles P. Cullinan, Hui Du, Gail B. Wright Abstract The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was designed to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting and prohibits public companies from granting loans to executives. Without considering the effects of executive loans on financial reporting, some researchers have questioned the appropriateness of the Act s loan prohibition [Kahle, K., Shastri, K., Executive loans. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39 (4), ; Henderson, M., Spindler, J., Corporate Heroin: A defense of perks, executive loans, and conspicuous consumption. The Georgetown Law Journal 93 (6)]. We examine whether executive loans are associated with financial misstatements. We find a significant association between executive loans and financial misstatements. Our results suggest that a relationship exists between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act s loan prohibition and the Act s objective of improving the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting. 1. Introduction İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 9

10 2. Background and research question 2.1. Research supportive of executive loans 2.2. Research not supportive of executive loans Loans and misstatements Shareholder perceptions of executive loans 2.3. Legislative history of executive loans 2.4. Research question 3. Research methods 3.1. Sample 3.2. Loan measures 3.3. Control variables 3.4. Testing techniques 4. Results and limitations 4.1. Results 4.2. Limitations 5. Conclusion İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 10