0088 NNİ İİSSAANN ÇÇAARRŞŞAAMBBAA SSAAYYI II: : 553300 Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Kavak, Ahmet. Kurumlar vergisi beyanname düzenlenmesi / Ahmet Kavak, Mustafa Çamlıca. İstanbul: İSMMMO, 2009. İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1
Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ MİLLETLER ARASI ANDLAŞMALAR 2009/14791 "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Lübnan Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Terörizm, Örgütlü Suçlar, Uyuşturucu ve Psikotrop Madde Kaçakçılığıyla Mücadele Alanında İşbirliği Anlaşması"nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/14796 Türk-Çin Karma Ekonomik ve Ticaret Komitesi Onbeşinci Dönem Toplantısı Mutabakat Zaptı nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar BAKANLAR KURULU KARARI 2009/14800 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Bünyesinde Doğrudan Merkeze Bağlı Taşra Teşkilatı Olarak Mersin İlinde Mersin Polis Meslek Eğitim Merkezi Müdürlüğü ve Bu Müdürlüğe Bağlı Olarak (6) Adet Şube Müdürlüğü Kurulması Hakkında Karar BAKANLIĞA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Adalet Bakanlığına, Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Cemil ÇİÇEK in Vekalet Etmesine Dair Tezkere YÖNETMELİKLER Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı Personeli Görevde Yükselme ve Unvan Değişikliği Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Ormancılık ve Orman Ürünleri Bürolarının Kuruluş ve Çalışma Esasları Yönetmeliği Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Sicil Amirleri Yönetmeliği Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Disiplin Amirleri Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik TEBLİĞLER Milli Emlak Genel Tebliği (Sıra No: 322) 2/1 Numaralı Ticari Amaçlı Su Ürünleri Avcılığını Düzenleyen Tebliğde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Tebliğ (No: 2009-37) İş Kolu Tespit Kararı (2009/12) İş Kolu Tespit Kararı (2009/13) DÜZELTME: (Gıda Güvenliği ve Kalitesinin Denetimini ve Kontrolüne Dair Yönetmelik ile İlgili) İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2
Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Volume 28, Issue 1, Pages 1-70 (January-February 2009) Shareholder litigation, management forecasts, and productive decisions during the initial public offerings Pages 1-15 Yinghua Li This paper develops a model to analyze the impact of shareholder litigation on managers voluntary disclosure strategies in equity offerings. The major findings are as follows. First, under different economic parameters, the entrepreneur has two possible equilibrium disclosure strategies: full and partial disclosure. Of particular interest is the latter equilibrium, in which shareholder litigation can give the entrepreneur incentives to partially disclose her private information. Second, production decisions might be distorted by the entrepreneur s disclosure incentives. The full disclosure equilibrium is associated with underinvestment, while overinvestment exists in the partial disclosure equilibrium. The model is then used to examine the effect of regulatory polices on firms disclosure incentives. It shows that relaxing the legal liability can result in more information flow to the public. However, it also leads to a higher rate of lawsuits and an increase in deadweight litigation costs. 1. Introduction 2. Institutional background 2.1. Current regulation on communications during IPOS 2.2. Recent reforms on securities litigation and disclosure regulation 3. Model setting and benchmark case 3.1. Setting and assumptions 3.2. Self-financing the benchmark case 4. Analysis of the equity offering İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3
4.1. The Lawyer s litigation decision at t = 2 4.2. The Entrepreneur s disclosure decision at t=1 if she is informed 4.3. The Entrepreneur s investment decision at t=1 4.3.1. Full disclosure 4.3.2. Partial disclosure 5. Welfare analysis and policy implications 5.1. Social welfare 5.2. Implications for SEC s proposed securities offering reform 5.2.1. Safe harbor for prospective information disclosure by IPO firms 5.2.2. Optimal ex ante disclosure policy 6. Discussion and conclusion Acknowledgements Appendix A. Summary of the notation Appendix B. Proofs B.1. Proof for footnote 10 B.2. Proof for Lemma 3 B.3. Proof for Proposition 3 The value relevance of R&D across profit and loss firms Pages 16-32 Laurel Franzen, Suresh Radhakrishnan We examine whether the valuation relevance of R&D documented for loss firms extends to profit firms. We use the residual-income valuation model and show that the valuation multiplier on R&D expenditures is likely to be negative (positive) for profit (loss) firms. This occurs because the linear information dynamics assumption of the residual-income model is more appropriate for profit firms than loss firms. Earnings of profit firms are likely to contain information on the future benefits of R&D activity, however, earnings of loss firms do not contain such information. The empirical evidence confirms our predictions for profit and loss firms. An important implication of our findings is that understanding the role of the R&D expense line item in valuation across firms and within firms, across time depends on whether the linear information İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4
dynamics assumption of the residual-income model is applicable for the sample of firms under investigation. 1. Introduction 2. Development of hypotheses 2.1. Valuation of R&D expenditures for profit and loss firms 2.1.1. Observation 2.2. Empirical specification, proxies and hypotheses 2.2.1. Hypotheses 3. Sample and empirical analysis 3.1. Sample selection 3.2. Descriptive statistics 3.3. Value-relevance of R&D for loss firms 3.3.1. Benchmark model 3.4. Model CPX 3.4.1. Test of pricing multipliers on RD and EBRD for profit and loss firms 3.5. Model RD 3.5.1. Estimating Eqs. (1b) 3.5.2. R&D intensity and value-relevance of R&D across profit and loss firms 3.5.3. Transition from loss to profit 4. Conclusions Appendix A. Appendix: R&D valuation in profit and loss firms Does audit quality matter more for firms with high investment opportunities? Pages 33-50 Kam-Wah Lai This paper examines the association of firms with high investment opportunities with high quality audits (proxied by Big 5 auditors) and whether that association results in a lower likelihood of earnings management. Firms with high investment opportunities İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5
may demand high quality audits for curbing earnings management. This is because they have more flexibility in the provision of discretionary accruals that arises from the attendant operating uncertainty which creates particular monitoring problems. Big 5 auditors will provide high quality audits that will constrain earnings management for firms with high investment opportunities because the risk of losing (and hence the likelihood of maintaining) auditor independence is higher. Results show the following. First, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors than firms with low investment opportunities. Second, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to have more discretionary accruals but this relationship is weaker when they have Big 5 auditors. These results are robust to various sensitivity tests. 1. Introduction 2. Hypotheses 3. Research method and sample 4. Results and discussion 4.1. Factor analysis 4.2. Demand for Big 5 auditors 4.2.1. Additional tests 4.3. Manipulation of discretionary accruals 4.3.1. Sensitivity analyses 4.3.1.1. More control variables 4.3.1.2. Total accruals 4.3.1.3. Firm performance 4.3.1.4. Auditor tenure 4.3.1.5. Self-selection 5. Conclusion Acknowledgements Response to FAF exposure draft, Proposed changes to oversight, structure, and operations of the FAF, FASB, and GASB Pages 51-57 İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6
American Accounting Association s Financial Accounting Standards Committee, Robert H. Colson, George J. Benston, Douglas C. Carmichael, Theodore E. Christensen, Karim Jamal, Stephen Moehrle, Shivaram Rajgopal, Thomas Stober, Shyam Sunder, Ross L. Watts The Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association (the Committee) is charged with responding to requests for comments from standard-setters on issues related to financial reporting. The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) released for public comment on December 18, 2007 with a response period ending on February 10, 2008, Proposed Changes to Oversight, Structure, and Operations of the FAF, FASB, and GASB (the proposal). This commentary concerns four important public policy issues in the proposal with the most relevance for accounting standard setting: 1. Reduce the size of the FASB from seven members to five; 2. Retain the FASB simple majority voting requirement; 3. Realign the FASB composition; and 4. Provide the FASB Chair with decision making authority to set the FASB technical agenda. On February 26, 2008, the FAF accepted all four proposals that we commented on. Despite their approval by the FAF, we maintain that each of these proposals not only does not improve, but potentially weakens the standard setting model. We encourage the FAF to renew its commitment to a member selection model designed to create an independent standard setting board. The four proposals put forth by the FAF can only increase the political nature of the FASB, further concentrate decision making power, and create higher barriers to achieve general acceptance of accounting standards. We maintain that the FAF should move in the opposite direction. In particular, we recommend that the FAF not reduce the FASB size and adopt a supermajority requirement not a simple voting requirement. If the majority cannot convince other members of the FASB about their views, how can we expect general acceptance of İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7
accounting standards in society? We also want a FASB that is open to more diverse views and more democratic. We urge the FAF to renew its commitment to openness and engagement with the accounting community instead of becoming more elitist and further concentrating power in the hands of a powerful chairman and a smaller standard setting board. 1. Introduction 2. Reduce the size of the FASB from seven members to five 3. Retain the FASB simple voting majority requirement 4. Realign the FASB composition 4.1. Drop the allocated academic seat on the FASB? 5. Provide the FASB chair with decision making authority to set the FASB technical agenda 6. Possibly another agenda? 7. Conclusion The role of audit evidence in a strategic audit Pages 58-67 Yasuhiro Ohta This study examines how audit risk (the probability of false acceptance) and its components change when the auditor obtains audit evidence in an acceptance sampling model. Inherent risk and audit risk increase with audit evidence if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive for committing fraud. Detection risk always increases when audit evidence is introduced. If the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive for avoiding false rejection, audit risk also increases with audit evidence. The analysis indicates that requiring auditors to obtain information is not effective in preventing material misstatements in at least some instances. İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8
1. Introduction 2. The game 3. The equilibrium 4. Comparative game analysis 4.1. Audit risk model 4.2. Inherent risk 4.3. Detection risk 4.4. Audit risk 5. Simple extensions 5.1. The auditor s information collection decision 5.2. The informativeness of audit evidence 6. Concluding remarks Acknowledgements Appendix. Appendix İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 9