0099 EEYYLLÜÜLL ÇÇAARRŞŞAAMBBAA SSAAYYI II: : 663377 Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1
Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ MİLLETLERARASI ANDLAŞMALAR 2009/15359 Sağlık Bakanlığı ve Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu Başkanlığınca Yürütülecek Olan Sağlıkta Dönüşüm ve Sosyal Güvenlik Reformu Projesinin Finansman İhtiyacının Karşılanması Amacıyla Uluslararası İmar ve Kalkınma Bankasından Sağlanan Krediye Dair Anlaşma ve Mektupların Yürürlüğe Girmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15391 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Cezayir Demokratik Halk Cumhuriyeti Arasında İmzalanan Dostluk ve İşbirliği Anlaşması nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/15392 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Kültür Varlığının Çalınmasının, Kaçak Kazı ve Yasa Dışı İthali ve İhracının Önlenmesine İlişkin Anlaşma nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar 2009/15401 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Lübnan Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Teknik Düzenlemeler, Standardizasyon, Metroloji, Akreditasyon ve Uygunluk Değerlendirmesi Alanlarında İşbirliğine Dair Mutabakat Zaptı nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar BAKANLAR KURULU KARARLARI 2009/15375 Bazı Anlaşmaların Yürürlüğe Girdiği Tarihlerinin Tespit Edilmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15406 Yurt İçi Sertifikalı Tohum Kullanımı ve Yurt İçi Sertifikalı Tohum Üretimi Desteklemeleri 2009 Yılı Uygulaması Birim Ödeme Miktarlarına Dair Karar BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Devlet Bakanı Faruk Nafız ÖZAK a, Devlet Bakanı Mehmet Zafer ÇAĞLAYAN ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere Dışişleri Bakanlığına, Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanı Taner YILDIZ ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2
Maliye Bakanlığına, Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Ali BABACAN ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere YÖNETMELİKLER 2009/15316 Binaların Yangından Korunması Hakkında Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı Döner Sermayeli İşletmeler Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik TEBLİĞLER Proje ve Kontrolluk İşlerinde Uygulanacak Fiyat Artış Oranları Hakkında Tebliğ Kamu Kurum ve Kuruluşlarının Daimi Kadrolarına İlk Defa İşçi Olarak Alınacakları İçin Yapılacak Merkezi Sınava Girecekler ile Eğitim Düzeyleri İtibarıyla Merkezi Sınav Dışında Kalanlar ve Bunların İşe Yerleştirilmelerine İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Tebliğin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tebliğ İşkolu Tespit Kararı (No: 2009/46) Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Financial Economics Volume 88, Issue 3, Pages 425-656 (June 2008) Darden conference issue: Capital raising in emerging economies Pages 425-429 Campbell R. Harvey, Marc L. Lipson, Francis E. Warnock 2. Governance 3. Capital structure 4. Internationalization 5. Conclusion The law and economics of self-dealing Pages 430-465 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights. İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3
2. Methodology 2.1. The regulation of self-dealing 2.1.1. Private enforcement 2.1.2. Public enforcement 3. Regulation of self-dealing across countries 3.1. Legal environment in Italy 3.2. Legal environment in the U.K. 3.3. Differences in regulatory approaches 4. Regulation of self-dealing and stock market development 5. Other measures of investor protection 6. Robustness 7. Summary and implications 7.1. Implications for the measurement of shareholder protection 7.2. Implications for the interpretation of legal origin 7.3. Implications for regulatory strategies Appendix A. Correlation Table Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them Pages 466-498 Marianne Bertrand, Simon Johnson, Krislert Samphantharak, Antoinette Schoar How does the structure of the families behind business groups affect the group's organization, governance, and performance? We construct a unique dataset of family trees and business groups for 93 of the largest business families in Thailand. We find a strong positive association between family size and family involvement in the ownership and control of the family businesses. The founders sons play a central role in both ownership and board membership, especially when the founder of the group is dead. Greater involvement by sons is also associated with lower firm-level performance, especially when the founder is dead. One hypothesis that emerges from İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4
our analysis is that part of the decay of family-run groups over time is due to the dilution of ownership and control across a set of equally powerful descendants of the founder, which creates a race to the bottom in tunneling resources out of the group firms. 2. Brief historical background 3. Data 3.1. Firms 3.2. Families 4. Descriptive statistics 5. Family structure and family involvement in the business 5.1. Ownership structure 5.2. Board positions 6. Real effects of family structure on the businesses they run 6.1. Family structure and firm performance 6.2. Governance and family structure 6.3. Group size and diversification and family structure 6.4. Firm performance and excess control 7. Conclusion Appendix A. Appendix A.1. Firm data A.2. Family data A.3. Matching family data with firm data A.4. for family information A.4.1. Books A.4.2. Funeral Books (All are in Thai) A.4.3. Magazine and Newspaper Articles (All are in Thai) A.5. Construction of excess control measures İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5
The colors of investors money: The role of institutional investors around the world Pages 499-533 Miguel A. Ferreira, Pedro Matos We study the role of institutional investors around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 countries. We find that all institutional investors have a strong preference for the stock of large firms and firms with good governance, while foreign institutions tend to overweight firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and members of the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index. Firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, better operating performance, and lower capital expenditures. Our results indicate that foreign and independent institutions, with potentially fewer business ties to firms, are involved in monitoring corporations worldwide. 2. Data description 2.1. Institutional investors holdings data 2.2. Institutional ownership measures 2.3. Sample construction and summary statistics 3. Determinants of institutional ownership 3.1. What attracts foreign and domestic institutions? 3.2. What attracts independent and grey institutions? 3.3. Robustness checks and additional tests 4. Institutional ownership and firm performance 4.1. Impact on firm value 4.2. Impact on operating performance and capital expenditures 5. Conclusion Appendix A. FactSet/LionShares institutional ownership database Appendix B. Appendix İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6
Capital structure with risky foreign investment Pages 534-553 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, James R. Hines Jr. Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence. 2. Political Risk and the Multinational Firm 3. Data 4. Impact of foreign political risk 4.1. Return characteristics in politically risky countries 4.2. U.S and worldwide leverage 4.3. Industry variation 4.4. Alternative measures of political risk 5. Conclusion Appendix A. Appendix Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions Pages 554-580 Stijn Claessens, Erik Feijen, Luc Laeven Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7
deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that did not around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests that contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of this rent seeking over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of gross domestic product per annum. 2. The Brazilian political system and the context of the 1998 and 2002 elections 3. Methodology 4. Data 4.1. Data sources 4.2. Descriptive statistics 5. Empirical results 5.1. Campaign contributions and stock returns 5.2. Preferential access to finance as a political favor 5.3. Economic costs of rents 6. Conclusions Appendix. Appendix Do local analysts know more? A cross-country study of the performance of local analysts and foreign analysts Pages 581-606 Kee-Hong Bae, René M. Stulz, Hongping Tan This paper examines whether analysts resident in a country make more precise earnings forecasts for firms in that country than non-resident analysts. Using a sample of 32 countries, we find an economically and statistically significant local analyst advantage even after controlling for firm and analyst characteristics. The local advantage is high in İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8
countries where earnings are smoothed more, less information is disclosed by firms, and firm idiosyncratic information explains a smaller fraction of stock returns. It is negatively related to whether a firm has foreign assets and to market participation by foreign investors and by institutions, and positively related to holdings by insiders. The extent to which U.S. investors underweight a country's stocks is positively related to that country's local analyst advantage. 2. Literature review 3. The sample 4. Analyst precision: univariate comparisons of local, expatriate, and foreign analysts 5. Is the local advantage explained by location? 5.1. Estimates of the local advantage 5.2. The local advantage across time and across countries 5.3. Where does the local advantage come from? 6. Do country characteristics help explain the local analyst advantage? 7. Is the local advantage endogenous? 8. Robustness tests 9. Conclusion Internationalization and the evolution of corporate valuation Pages 607-632 Juan Carlos Gozzi, Ross Levine, Sergio L. Schmukler By documenting the evolution of Tobin's q before, during, and after firms internationalize, this paper provides evidence on the bonding, segmentation, and market-timing theories of internationalization. We find that Tobin's q does not rise after internationalization, even relative to domestic firms. Instead, q rises significantly before and during the internationalization year, but then falls sharply in the following year, quickly relinquishing the increases of the previous years. In decomposing these dynamics, we find that market capitalization rises before internationalization and İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 9
remains high, while corporate assets increase during internationalization. The evidence supports the theory that financial internationalization facilitates corporate expansion, but challenges the theory that internationalization produces an enduring effect on q by bonding firms to a better corporate governance system. 2. Data 3. Results: before and after internationalization 3.1. Do international firms have higher qs? 3.2. Is q higher after internationalization? 3.3. Internationalization: different subsamples 3.3.1. Differentiating by exchange type 3.3.2. Differentiating by equity offering type 3.3.3. Differentiating by capital raising type 3.3.4. Differentiating by listing in U.S. markets 3.3.5. Firms from countries with weak shareholder rights 4. Results: dynamics 4.1. Results on the evolution of q and its components 4.2. Robustness tests regarding market timing 5. Conclusions Appendix A. Appendix Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of foreign entry liberalization Pages 633-656 Anusha Chari, Nandini Gupta This paper investigates the influence of incumbent firms on the decision to allow foreign direct investment into an industry. Using data from India's economic reforms, the results show that firms in concentrated industries are more successful at preventing foreign entry, state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 10
privately-owned firms, and profitable state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than unprofitable state-owned firms. The pattern of foreign entry liberalization supports the private interest view of policy implementation and suggests that it may be necessary to reduce the influence of state-owned firms to optimally enact reforms. 2. Reforms and industrial structure 2.1. Liberalizing foreign entry in India 2.2. The lobbying process in India 3. Hypotheses and evidence 3.1. Descriptive statistics 3.2. The role of industry concentration 3.3. The role of industry profitability 3.4. The role of firm ownership: state-owned firms 3.5. The role of industry location 4. The data 4.1. Coverage in prowess 5. Results 5.1. Do concentrated industries influence the pattern of foreign entry liberalization? 5.2. Why do firms in concentrated industries oppose foreign entry liberalization? 5.3. Does labor influence foreign entry liberalization? 5.4. Does the influence of incumbent firms vary by ownership category? 5.5. Does industry location explain the pattern of liberalization? 6. Additional tests and robustness checks 6.1. The impact of contemporaneous reforms 6.2. Alternative measures of industry concentration 6.3. Natural monopolies and strategic industries 7. Concluding remarks Appendix A. Appendix İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 11