Civilacademy Journal of Social Sciences Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi Fatih University 2010
Civilacademy Cilt / Volume 8 Sayı / Issue 3 Kış / Winter 2010 Sahibi / Owner Civilacademy Sosyal Bilimler Topluluğu Civilacademy Social Sciences Society Editör / Editor Ertuğrul Gündoğan (Fatih Uni.) Yardımcı Editörler / Co-editors Gülşah Neslihan Demir (Lund Uni.) Ömer Akkaya (Johns Hopkins Uni.) Tamer Güven (Fatih Uni.) Baskı / Printed in: Görsel Dizayn Ofset Matbaacılık Tic. Ltd. Şti. Tel: 212 671 91 00 İletişim Adresi / Correspondence Address Civilacademy Sosyal Bilimler Topluluğu Fatih Üniversitesi Büyükçekmece Kampüsü 34500 Büyükçekmece / İstanbul Tel: + 90 212 866 33 00 Web:.fatih.edu.tr E-mail: @gmail.com II
Danışma ve Hakem Kurulu / Advisory Board 1 Abdülkadir Civan (Fatih Ünv.), Ali Murat Yel (Fatih Ünv.), Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (Uludağ Ünv.), Alpaslan Açıkgenç (Fatih Ünv.), Atilla Girgin (Marmara Ünv.), Bedriye Saraçoğlu (Gazi Ünv.), Berdal Aral (Fatih Ünv.), Elif Ekin Akşit (Ankara Ünv.), Erdoğan Keskinkılıç (Fatih Ünv.), Ertuğrul Gündoğan (Fatih Ünv.), Ferda Keskin (Bilgi Ünv.), Fuat Keyman (Koç Ünv.), Gökhan Bacık (Zirve Ünv.), İdil Işık (Fatih Ünv.), İrfan Erdoğan (Gazi Ünv.), Kemal Karpat (Wisconsin Ünv.), Kemal Özden (Fatih Ünv.), Kevin J. McGinley (Fatih Ünv.), Mehmet İpşirli (Fatih Ünv.), Mete Tunçay (Bilgi Ünv.), Mümtaz er Türköne (Gazi Ünv.), Nihat Solakoğlu (Bilkent Ünv.), Nizamettin Bayyurt (Fatih Ünv.), N. Gökhan Torlak (Fatih Ünv.), Ömer Çaha (Fatih Ünv.), Ralph J. Poole (Salzburg Ünv.), Recep Şentürk (FatihÜnv), Savaş Genç (Fatih Ünv.), Sezai Coşkun (Fatih Ünv.), Şammas Salur (Fatih Ünv.), Şengül Çelik(Fatih Ünv.), Şükran Esen (Marmara Ünv.), Talip Küçükcan (SETA), Visam Mansur (Fatih Ünv.), Yasin Aktay (Selçuk Ünv.) İngilizce Redaktörler / English Redactors Betty and Barrie Eichhorn Türkçe Redaktörler / Turkish Redactors Mehmet Kutalmış Civilacademy Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (ISSN 1304-9119) yılda üç defa yayınlanır. Civilacademy Journal of Social Sciences (ISSN 1304-9119) is published three times in a year periodically. Civilacademy Dergisi Gale Cengage Learning, ASOS Index ve TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM Sosyal Bilimler Veritabanı tarafından indekslenmektedir. Civilacademy Journal of Social Sciences is indexed in Gale Cengage Learning, ASOS Index, and TUBITAK ULAKBIM Social Sciences Database. 1 İsme göre alfabetik olarak sıralanmıştır. Listed alphabetically by name. III
Amaç ve Kapsam Civilacademy Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, disiplinler arası, hakemli, Türkçe ve İngilizce dillerinde yayınlanan bir sosyal bilimler dergisidir. Civilacademy Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, insanları ve toplumu ilgilendiren tüm konulara sosyal bilimler perspektifinden yaklaşan, mevcut ve alternatif paradigmaların tartışmaya açıldığı bir platform olmayı amaçlamaktadır. Aims and Scope Civilacademy Journal of Social Sciences is a peer reviewed interdisciplinary bilingual (both Turkish and English) social science journal. The aim of Civilacademy Journal of Social Sciences is to provide an intellectual platform for social-scientific studies, a platform in which research in alternative paradigms for social inquiry could be jointly presented and debated and is to publish conceptual, research, and/or case based works that can be of practical value to the people interested. IV
İçindekiler / Contents Editörün Notu / Editor s Note Begüm BURAK Turkish Political Culture and Democracy: A Forced Marriage or not? (Türk Siyasal Kültürü ve Demokrasi: Zoraki Bir Nikâh mı?) Şükrü NİŞANCI, Adem ÇELİK Modern Siyaset Kuramında Herbert Marcuse ve Olumsuzlama Felsefesi (Herbert Marcuse in Modern Political Theory and His Critical Philosophy) Burcu ERTUNA Küreselleşmenin Kadın İşçileri: Direniş ve Faillik (Women Workers of Globalization: Resistance and Agency) Hakan Övünç ONGUR Günümüz Türk Azınlıklar Anlayışında Osmanlı Mirası ve Lozan Antlaşması Sonrası Türkiye de Azınlıklar (Ottoman Heritage in the Contemporary Turkish Perception of Minorities and Minorities in Turkey After the Treaty of Lausanne) V
Mehmet YAVUZ Şeyh Bedreddin in Alevi-Bektaşi Toplumundaki Yeri ve Alevi-Bektaşi Şairlerinde Şeyh Bedreddin Telmihi (Significance of Sheik Bedreddin in Alevi-Bektaşi Community and Reference of Sheik Bedreddin in Alevi- Bektaşi Poets) Yakup ÇETİN, Şaban ÇEPİK Türkçedeki Yabancı Kelimelere Akademisyenlerin Bakışları (Academicians View of Foreign Words in Turkish Language) Ayşegül YARAMAN Potansiyel Muhalefete Karşı Kurgulanmış Kayıtsızlık (Proposed Indifference Against Potential Opposition) Yazara Notlar... Guide for Authors VI
Civilacademy Journal of Social Sciences Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi VII
Editörün Notu Merhaba, Konuşacak çok konu var; Türkiye de, Avrupa da ve dünyada. Daha çok sorun daha fazla mağduriyet ve daha fazla acziyet demek. Anlayışa, müzakereye, işbirliğine ve pozitif düşünmeye ihtiyaç var. Bir o kadar da anlayışsızlık, kapalılık, rekabet ve negatif düşünce var. Yeni düşünceler niçin artık insanlığı heyecanlandırmıyor ya da neden kurulu düzenleri yeniden ele alma sonucunu doğurmuyor? Gerçekten Huntington ın hahsettiği Medeniyetler Çatışması sonuçlandı ve Fukuyama nın dediği gibi Tarihin Sonu mu geldi? Halbuki, muzaffer Batı da, kürenin diğer parçaları gibi sorunlarla boğuşuyor. Batı dünyayı aydınlattı ve demokrasiyi getirip çağ dışı rejimlerden kurtardı, kurtarıyor... Batı yı kim kurtaracak kendi sorunlarından? Nasıl ve ne zaman? Dünyanın diğer parçaları, 18. Yüzyılın ortalarında Fransız Akademi başkanının dediği gibi, atalette kalmaya devam edecek mi, yoksa inisiyatif alıp, insanlığın ve dünyanın, hatta Batı nın geleceğine ilişkin yeni sözler söyleyecekler mi? Öngörülü bir yaklaşımla, dünyanın geri kalan kısmının sadık bir izleyici gibi adım adım Batı yı izleyerek, aynı sorunları ve krizleri sadece zaman farkıyla sonradan yaşamaları nasıl önlenebilir? Düşünce platformları, fikir emekçileri, üniversiteler, enstitüler, yazanlar, çizenler, düşünenler bu süreçlere nasıl katkıda bulunabilirler? Küresel İnsani Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri üzerine Özel Sayı çıkarmak gibi bir düşüncemiz var. Somut olay ve durumlardan daha çok, teorik ve felsefi altyapısı olan makale ve çalışmaları içeren bir sayı çıkarmak üzere yola çıkalım. 2012 içinde çıkmasını umduğumuz bu özel sayı için özel düşünceler, teorik ve felsefi katkıları beklemeye başlıyoruz. Daha iyi bir yıl ve daha güzel zamanlar dileklerimle Ertuğrul Gündoğan VIII
Editor s Note Greetings! There are a lot of issues to talk about, in Turkey, in Europe, and in the world. More problems mean more victimizations and more desperation. There is a huge need for consideration, dialogue, collaboration, and positive thinking as well as the presence of insensitivity, closeness, competition and negative thinking. Why don t the new thoughts excite the humanity or result at reconsidering the existing order? Did the Clash of the Civilizations occur as Huntington mentioned and we reach the End of the History as pointed by Fukuyama? Nevertheless, like the other parts of the world, the victorious west is struggling with problems. The west enlightened the world, brought the democracy and saved the world from outdated regimes and is still doing this So who will save the west from its problems? How and when? Will the other parts of the world remain in laziness, as the Chairman of French Academy stated in the mid-18th century? Or will they take initiative and tell new words about the future of the humanity, the world, and even the west? How the experience of the same problems and crises by the rest of the world just with a time difference through following the west step by step, like a loyal audience, could be prevented? How could the think-tanks, intellectuals, writers, thinkers, and the others contribute to this process? We are considering preparing a special issue on the Global Human Problems and Solution Recommendations. We would like to include articles grounded on theoretical and philosophical frameworks rather than those with concrete events and situations. We are seeking special thoughts, theoretical and philosophical contributions to this special issue that we are planning to publish in 2012. With my wishes for a better year and better times Ertugrul Gundogan IX
TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY: A FORCED MARRIAGE OR NOT? Türk Siyasal Kültürü ve Demokrasi: Zoraki Bir Nikâh mı? Begüm BURAK 1 ÖZET Bu çalışmanın başlangıç noktasını Demokratik bir siyasal yaşam ile siyasal kültür arasında nasıl bir ilişki biçimi vardır? sorusu oluşturmaktadır. Bu sorunun cevabı Türk siyasal yaşamı bağlamında aranacaktır. Bilindiği gibi, bir ülkenin siyasal sistemine etki eden çok çeşitli faktörler mevcuttur, siyasal kültürün bu faktörler içinde önemli bir role sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Bu çalışmanın temel iddiası, demokratik kurumların kurulması ve güçlü bir demokrasiye sahip olunması için, ilk ve en önemli gerekliliğin uygun 1 Research Assistant, Fatih University Department of Political Science and Public Administration, bgmbrk@hotmail.com 1
Begüm BURAK bir siyasal kültürün varlığı olduğunu savunmaktadır. Çünkü demokrasinin kasabadaki tek oyun olması için, elitler ve kitlelerce demokratik değerler içselleştirilmelidir ki, bu da siyasal kültürle doğrudan ilgilidir. Türkiye de son yıllarda yaşanan sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasal gelişmelerin, gerek Türk toplumunun, gerekse siyasi aktörlerin demokrasiye yönelik tutumlarını olumlu yönde değiştirdiği söylenebilir. Ancak, bu, Türkiye deki siyasal kültürün tamamen demokrasi yönünde değiştiği anlamına gelmemektedir. Siyasal kültür birden ortaya çıkmadığı gibi kısa sürede değişime veya dönüşüme de uğramaz. Bu çalışmada, genel olarak siyasal kültürün; özel olarak ise Türk siyasal kültürünün özellikleri ve bu özelliklerin siyasete ve demokrasiye yansımaları üzerinde durulacaktır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal Kültür, Demokrasi, Türk Siyasal Kültürü, Demokratik Pekişme, Sivil Toplum. ABSTRACT In this study, a basic question constitutes the starting point: Are some specific aspects of culture necessary for democracy and if so, which and how? The answer of this question will be traced within the context of Turkish political life. As known, there are various factors that have an influential role in political system of a country, but political culture s role cannot be underestimated while evaluating political life in a country. The main argument of this study is that, to be able to establish democratic institutions and to be able to have a consolidated democracy, the first and foremost necessity is the existence of a proper political culture. Because, in order for democracy to become the only game in town, the 2
masses as well as the elites must adopt and internalize democratic values, and this is directly about the political culture. It could be said that, the very recent social, economic and political improvements in Turkish society have resulted in breaking off the attitudes against democracy. However, this does not mean that political culture in Turkey has completely changed in favor of a fully-democratic system. Because, political culture cannot change or get transformed abruptly as it has not come into being all of a sudden. In this study, the main features of political culture in general and Turkish political culture in particular will be analyzed as well as paying attention to its impact upon political phenomena. Key Words: Political Culture, Democracy, Turkish Political Culture, Democratic Consolidation, Civil Society. democracy/democratic institutions and political culture. Introduction In this study a classic and still controversial issue in political science will be quested: what role does political culture play in providing and sustaining stable democratic institutions? Within the framework of this question, the case of Turkey as a relatively young democracy (from 1950 onwards) will be analyzed with regard to the relationship between The central point of concern in this study will be about the role of political culture in sustaining democratic stability. Hence the economic performance, social indicators and their impact upon democracy will be out of inquiry. This study s most important purpose is to outline the logical status of political culture as a component in the explanation of political phenomena. A body of literature that 3
Begüm BURAK goes back to Lipset and Almond and Verba serves quite well in highlighting the casual mechanisms between a specific political culture and effective democracy. As known, different societies are characterized by different cultural attitudes and these cultural attitudes have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions. The main argument of this study is that the evolution and persistence of mass-based democracy requires the emergence of certain supportive habits and attitudes among the general public. Thus, in Turkish case; despite the fact that in the very beginning, democracy was given as a favor to Turkish people by the political leaders of the time-being, later on, democracy s continuity and discontinuity have been largely determined by the political culture at both the state level 1 and mass level. Indeed, there are a number of preconditions of democracy. Economic wealth, social structure with relatively autonomous social classes, external environment all play a significant role in the 1 Political culture at the state level implies the political culture of political elites and state elites as a whole establishment and stability of democracy as a political system. However, in this study, the cultural context will be under scrutiny with references to Turkish political system from a historical perspective. Political Culture: An Overview The concept of political culture is not new. Tocqueville, for one, made political culture a theme central to stability when he wrote that in order that society should exist and, a fortiori, that society should prosper, it is necessary that the mind of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas; and this cannot be the case unless each of them sometimes draws his opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of belief already formed (Quoted in Carlos Rivero et. al. (2010: 167). Above all, simply, political culture can be defined as the sum of assumptions about the political world (David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon 1979: 127). Assumptions about the political world focus attention on certain 4
features of institutions, events and behavior, define the realm of the possible, identify the problems deemed pertinent, and set the ranges of alternatives among which members of the population make decisions (Ibid: 128). Almond and Verba defined political culture as the attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system (A. Almond and S. Verba 1963: 13). To them, political culture is a set of individual psychological states, which can be revealed through survey questionnaires. Political culture is seen as a cross between a catalyst and a fertilizer, providing the conditions for change and sustaining the product of that change (Ibid). Political culture may or may not be congruent with the structure of the political system. In other words, different cultures fit different regimes. This gives rise to the idea that only a certain type of political culture civic culture is appropriate to democracy. Civic culture is a participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent (Carlos Rivero, ibid: 168). It should be stressed that, political culture is the property of a collectivity nation, region, ethnic community, class, party and so on. Individuals have beliefs, attitudes and values but they do not have cultures. Political culture refers to the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions. It refers not to what is happening in the world of politics, but what people believe about these happenings. Political culture can be defined as a set of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards the political system. On the other hand, Almond and Verba (1963) sought to identify the features of political culture that foster democratic performance. They paid special attention to the contrast between participant and subject cultures, arguing that democratic outcomes are more likely where participatory norms are widespread and less likely where values take a passive and subjective form. Democracy and Democratic Consolidation Democracy is much broader than a special political form, a 5
Begüm BURAK method of conducting government, of making laws and carrying on governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and elected officers. What exactly is democracy? Democracy must not be identified with majority rule. Democracy has complex demands, which certainly include voting and respect for election results, but it also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair comment. Even elections can be deeply defective if they occur without the different sides getting an adequate opportunity to present their respective cases, or without the electorate enjoying the freedom to obtain news and to consider the views of the competing protagonists. Democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation (Amartya Sen 1999: 4). Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. (Quoted in Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl 1991 : 77). Citizens are the most distinctive element in democracies. All regimes have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are democratic do they have citizens. Moreover, the most popular definition of democracy equates it with regular elections, fairly conducted and honestly counted. Some even consider the mere fact of elections - even ones from which specific parties or candidates are excluded, or in which substantial portions of the population cannot freely participate-as a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy (Ibid : 78). Cooperation has always been a central feature of democracy. Actors must voluntarily make collective decisions binding on the polity as a whole. They must cooperate in order to compete. They must be capable of acting collectively through parties, associations, and movements in order to select candidates, articulate preferences, petition authorities, and influence policies. The defining components of democracy are necessarily abstract, and may give rise to a considerable variety of institutions and subtypes 6
of democracy. For democracy to thrive, however, specific procedural norms must be followed and civic rights must be respected. Any polity that fails to impose such restrictions upon itself, that fails to follow the rule of law with regard to its own procedures, should not be considered democratic. (Ibid : 80-81) According to a reputable scholar Robert Dahl, democracy is very important depending on a variety of consequences it produces. Dahl argues in his book On Democracy (1998) that democracy produces desirable consequences such as essential rights, general freedom, moral autonomy, human development, prosperity, political equality and so on. On the other hand, in its most widespread acceptation a consolidated democracy is one that is unlikely to break down. It could be said that democratic consolidation is a process which the leaders and primary political groups of the new system seek to deepen its base of social support, demonstrate its (and their own) effectiveness, and establish it as the only acceptable arena for advocating interests, resolving disputes, and making policy. Consolidation requires not only a sustainable democratic government but also acceptance and participation on the part of society. A shift to a market economy (or efforts to reform existing market institutions), while analytically a distinct process, has generally accompanied the democratic consolidation efforts of the last decade, often becoming a key index of the new regime s effectiveness (Michael Johnston 2000: 9). Consolidation is used to refer to processes through which acceptance of a given set of constitutional rules becomes increasingly widespread, valued, and routinized. It is important to make a clear distinction between the survival of democracies and their consolidation. During the 1980s, many new democracies survived severe economic shocks, but their durability was often attributable to factors that did not necessarily imply increasing legitimacy and acceptance of the rules of the game (Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman 1994: 6). Most authors agree that democratic consolidation is a phase in regime change which opens 7
Begüm BURAK the moment the prior phase of democratic transition has come to a happy ending. Some authors argue that both phases may overlap and most admit that it is hard to define precise endpoints of democratic consolidation. The most popular meaning attached to democratic consolidation is that, a consolidated democracy implies that democracy is the only game in town. In other words, its norms and values are internalized and democratic breakdown cannot be a point at issue. This simply means that both the elites and the masses have internalized a democratic political culture. It must be asserted that, the relationship between state and (civil) society plays a key role in determining the state of democracy in a society. Also it must be underlined that this relationship has a major role in shaping the political culture too. Whether it be a participant or a subject political culture, it is heavily determined by state-society relations. Civil society is conceived as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable (Larry Diamond 1994: 5). With regard to this definition, it could be asserted that, the degree of civil society s autonomy and its status related to the state apparatus play an important role in shaping political culture and political character. There are various democratic functions of civil society. The first and the most basic democratic function of civil society is to provide the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control. This function has two dimensions: to monitor and restrain the exercise of power by democratic states, and to democratize authoritarian states (Ibid : 7) 8
Civil society is also a vital instrument for containing the power of democratic governments, checking their potential abuses and violations of the law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny. Indeed, a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it (Ibid). In short, it could be said that, democracy s first and foremost defining criterion is the ability of the citizens to be able to determine their political leaders and political system while also each having an equal degree of chance to be able to become a part of the political elite someday. However, democratic consolidation needs the internalization of democratic values and the persistence of democratic processes and procedures to come into being. Furthermore, it should also be emphasized that, a certain kind of political culture is needed in order for democracy to be established and to become consolidated (Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel 2003: 66). Thus the next part will undertake political culture and its impact upon political phenomena. Political Culture and Democracy The research on political culture falls into three main approaches, with adherents of each approach emphasizing different types of mass values as most important in strengthening democracy. These approaches are labeled as the legitimacy approach or system-support approach, the communitarian approach or social capital approach, and the human development approach or emancipative approach (Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel 2005: 257). In a highly influential study, David Easton (1965) argued that all political systems need legitimacy, which they obtain if their public supports the system s specific institutions and the system as a whole. Accordingly, adherents of the legitimacy approach argue that mass support for a given system of governance, and mass confidence in its specific institutions, provide political systems with the legitimacy that they need to operate effectively. Two other approaches the communitarian and the human development approach follow the 9
Begüm BURAK tradition of the civic culture school 2 in arguing that making democracy work requires more than just having confidence in institutions and preferring democracy to alternative systems of government; it requires a broader set of civic values ( Inglehart and Welzel, ibid ). The communitarian approach emphasizes values that link the citizens to daily public life and strengthen their social ties and their loyalty to the community (Bell 1993; Etzioni 1996). According to Putnam (1993, 2000), such communal orientations create social capital and are reflected in 2 Civic culture is a term coined by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) to describe the set of related political and social attitudes said to be crucial to the success of modern democracies. Using what were at the time new survey research techniques, Almond and Verba studied attitudes in five countries: England, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United States. In the process, they shifted comparative political studies away from a nearly exclusive preoccupation with constitutional analysis to the study of comparative behavior. The authors updated their earlier work in 1989. The original publication of this book had a great impact. As a result of Almond and Verba s work, the term civic culture has a narrower focus than the larger subject of culture in general. Civic culture relates to cultural attitudes. Other cultural objects, both material and symbolic, that might be associated with civic attitudes and behavior have received comparatively less emphasis by political scientists under the rubric of civic culture. Among these, for example, might be included such civic culture objects as patriotic parades and public gatherings, public proclamations and speeches by public officials, public statuary, and numerous other cultural objects (Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba 1989). people s activities in voluntary associations and in their trust in their fellow citizens. Thus, communitarians and social capital theorists emphasize membership in voluntary associations and interpersonal trust as the communal ground on which democracies flourish (See Norris 2002: Chapter 8). Another school in the communitarian debate emphasizes the citizens conformity to laws and their loyalty to rules of good conduct, or what they call civic honesty or trustworthiness, as the moral resource that sustains and strengthens democracy. In contrast to dictatorships, democracies have only limited repressive ability in order to enforce laws. Thus, more than any other system of government, democracy depends on citizens voluntary compliance, or what we will call norm obedience. The human development approach shares with the communitarian approach the belief that civic values, rather than just specific orientations toward the political system and its institutions, are important for democracy. Human development theory is a theory of the societal 10
conditions that restrict or widen people s choices. Democracy is a key one of these conditions. It institutionalizes civil and political liberties, providing people legal guarantees to make free choices in their private and public activities (Inglehart and Welzel, ibid: 248). In short, three distinct approaches emphasize three different aspects of mass culture as being most conducive to democracy. First, the legitimacy approach (or system support approach) emphasizes institutional confidence and support for democracy. Support for democracy is considered particularly crucial in delegitimizing autocracy and legitimizing democracy, regardless of the motivations and values underlying support for democracy. Second, the communitarian approach (or social capital approach) emphasizes norm conformity, associational activity, and interpersonal trust as producing the community bonds and civic loyalties that enable democracy to flourish. Third, the human development approach emphasizes self-expression values, particularly liberty aspirations, as the mass orientation most intrinsically relevant to democracy and its emphasis on human choice. On the other hand, the strongest advocate of the political culture approach to the study of democracy has remained Ronald Inglehart. He defined civic culture as a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, and interpersonal trust and support for the existing political order. Anticipating Putnam s argument somewhat, Inglehart suggested that high and low levels of civic culture appear to be stable and enduring even over centuries. He spared no effort to design tests aimed at giving greater confidence to his conclusions (Inglehart 1990). Inglehart found that three variables-interpersonal trust, support for revolutionary change, and life satisfaction-form a broad syndrome of related attitudes... [that] show impressive stability over time. It is worth noting that Inglehart and others have identified a broad syndrome of self-expression values 3 that includes not only interpersonal trust and life satisfaction but also several other 3 Self-expression values are a syndrome of mass attitudes that tap a common underlying dimension, reflecting emphasis on freedom, tolerance of diversity, and participation, at both the individual and aggregate levels. Self-expression values are present in a political culture in so far as the public emphasizes liberty and participation, public self-expression, tolerance of diversity, interpersonal trust, and life satisfaction. 11
Begüm BURAK attitudes that seem to play even more important roles in promoting democracy. In addition, it has been argued that societies with relatively high levels of interpersonal trust and life satisfaction were much more likely to have democratic institutions than societies with relatively low levels of trust and well-being (Inglehart and Welzel 2003: 74-75). culture is related to State Mythos. In Turkey, even in the field of thoughts, state has a dominant and decisive role, and the roots of that role go back to Ottoman times. According to Şerif Mardin, in Ottoman-Turkish political and intellectual history, the ideas that stress the liberation of the state have always been overwhelming (Quoted in Mümtaz er Türköne 2010: 247). How Does Political Culture Influence Democracy: The Turkish Experiment As noted above, political culture plays a major role in determining the political phenomena. In this context, it could be stated that, democratic process, institutions and procedures are also heavily dependent on the political culture. Thus, in this part, Turkish political culture will be analyzed in order to understand its impact upon Turkish political life as a whole. Central Features of Turkish Political Culture One of the most salient characteristics of Turkish political On the other hand, it can be stated that since the Ottoman times, the elites of the government structure and the state apparatus have been defined as a monolithic body that has a supreme voice over the society and the masses as a whole. From this point of view, this group of elites has been seen as the Center, whereas the ruled masses have been seen as the Periphery (Şerif Mardin 1973). According to this center-periphery approach towards Turkish political life, there has always been a tension between the two sides so far. However, it is obvious that since the Özal rule, Turkish society and politics as well as her economic structure have changed to a considerable degree and that change has paved the way for a more democratic culture. The Ottoman political 12
structure, different from Western feudalism, had all its political authority concentrated on a single center. Besides, a civil society in Hegelian terms had been quite weak and a model of bureaucratic empire had been established. Ergun Özbudun underlines the absence of intermediary institutions which would delimit state authority (Ibid). The most remarkable element of such a strong state understanding is the emergence of respect and praise for authority. In Western tradition, state is seen as a product of civil society, by contrast, in the Ottoman political tradition, state is seen as a transcendental and supreme entity (Ibid : 248). This perception of (strong) state has shaped Turkish modernization process deeply too. In parallel to this understanding, a state-originated and top-down modernization process had been adopted. It must also be stated that, the forces which built a new nation-state and got engaged in modernizing it were not the bourgeoisie but the bureaucratic elites (Çağlar Keyder 2008: 9). On the other hand, the process through which the bureaucratic tradition was constituted and developed has always been an obstacle against the strengthening of democracy in Turkey. The bureaucratic tradition has, from the very beginning had an authoritarian character. The bureaucratic tradition which was firstly shaped in the Tanzimat era has kept its relatively dominant role in the Republican era too. That bureaucratic structure has been one of the leading factors that paved the way for the production of elitist and tutelary political tendencies in Ottoman-Turkish political history (Mümtaz er Türköne, ibid: 249). Another key characteristic of Turkish political culture which largely inherited from Ot-toman times, has been related to the economic structure that did not produce any asset. Especially, the systematic statist practices have made the economic sphere become dependent on state, eroding its autonomy. It can be said that, statist practices may be seen as an instrument used by the state elites to control social and classorientated developments. Another important dimension of Turkish political culture is the political position that the Army has been holding since the establishment of the Republic. 13
Begüm BURAK Unlike its counterparts in other democratic countries, the Turkish Army has a considerable amount of political and institutional autonomy which ultimately leads to emphasize its role in guarding the state from internal enemies. (Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu 1997). This term of internal enemy refers to political Islam and Kurdish movement, and from time to time the military elites exercise direct and / or indirect political authority to a variety of extents. The role of the Army in Ottoman-Turkish history is an important tool to understand the main premises of Turkish political culture. With the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the Army started to place itself in daily politics with administrative motives. There is a consensus on the political and institutional autonomy of the Army, and that autonomy paves the way for democracy to become rather fragile. However, not so much reaction has been existent in terms of that autonomy. As a result, the democratic consolidation of Turkey cannot be fully realized. On the one hand, the military elites role in the modernization process in the late Ottoman and early Republican era is generally taken as the principal cause of military interventions. Because the Turkish Army, as the sole actor in safeguarding the state from external and internal enemies, most of the time depends on its historical role in building a nationstate. On the other, the Army is also seen as the only legitimate guarantor of Kemalist ideology (Hikmet Özdemir, 1994). It must also be underlined that, the historical background of Turkey from the very beginning of the Republic experienced an evident antagonism between the state and the society. In addition to that, along with the military, the high bureaucracy of Turkey for several decades have revealed a certain amount of distrust towards the society. So it may be stated that, state-society relations until the late 1990s were quite deterrent for democratic consolidation. Indeed, lacking a civil society tradition, Turkey, once free from state dominance, has degenerated into destructive party strife. In Turkey, under the state-dominated polity the democracy has stumbled along; under a party-centered polity, however, it has collapsed (C. H. Dodd 1992: 28). 14
Apart from that, it has been argued that in Turkey, the state dominance over the individual and the society has always been strong. This argument also emphasizes that the political culture which has been determined and shaped by the elites has been kept away from the social dynamics. (Ali Yaşar Sarıbay 1998: 58). According to a comprehensive study about Turkish political culture, it has been revealed that attitudes conducive to democracy and democratization are held by a relatively limited number of Turkish citizens, and that, accordingly, an appropriate political culture probably does not yet exist to the extent necessary for democratic consolidation ( Mark Tessler and Ebru Altınoglu 2004: 43). On the other hand, ultrasecularist understanding in Turkey constitutes another factor that may be seen important in shaping political culture. An important style of secularism is İnönü-style secularism (so named for second president of the republic, İsmet İnönü). This is more about the elitist protection of Kemalism. Early Kemalism was an idealist program. Devoted Kemalists believed that the Anatolian masses would embrace their ideals ( Gökhan Bacık 2011: 14). However, this belief has paved the way for the emergence of undemocratic practices later on. Finally, Turkish political culture s basic contours such as the superiority of collectivities over individuals, the instrumentalist use of political authority for controlling and manipulating the masses, the political role of the military elites, the relatively weak civil society and strong state tradition all shape the state of democracy. Turkey: How Close to Democratic Consolidation? The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong, centralized, and highly bureaucratic state. Indeed, the output structures of the state (the civil service, armed forces, police, and courts) have been so highly institutionalized that this overdevelopment of the state machinery, coupled with the predominance of a strong-state tradition in Turkish political culture, may impede the emergence of more balanced relations between 15
Begüm BURAK the state and civil society (Ergun Özbudun 1996: 123). On the other hand; in Turkey, political identities are defined within the framework of a community phenomenon. In other words, if you criticize a political position, this means that you definitely identify yourself with its opposite position. Thus you can either be a religious person or a secular person, no way in between (Ayşe Kadıoğlu 1999: 13). This kind of political identity definition also weakens democratic processes such as negotiation and bargaining. Apart from that, Turkish political culture is heavily shaped by elites and this has made that culture get away from social dynamics. Strong state tradition has also weakened the social actors through penetrating each single corner of political and social life (Demet Parlak 2008: 1). These developments also make it hard for democracy to get consolidated. As noted above, there are a number of cultural factors influencing Turkish democracy in particular and Turkish political life in general. In analyzing this, it could be said that the most obvious cultural trait of Turkish political life is the strong state tradition which undermines democratic consolidation. Besides that, the relatively low degree of political institutionalization paves the way for solving political problems through non-political tools like military interventions. As known, an effective civil society is sine qua non for the enhancement of democracy. As civil society is generally conceptualized as the social space in which a democratic polity is enacted, its effectiveness plays a key role in a democratic system. However, in Turkey, the state of civil society has not been cheering for a couple of reasons. Above all, the meaning and transcendental status attached to the image of state play a major role in this. Moreover, the non-state units in Turkey have always been dependent on the state power in order to survive so far. On the other hand, another significant dimension of Turkish political culture that impedes democratic consolidation and erodes the view that democracy is the only game in town is the political position of the military elites. From a historical perspective, the state-building process of modern Turkey is heavily based 16
on the leadership of a group of enlightened elites (both military and civilian) who take themselves as the principal actors in creating a modern Westernized state. In that process, the public was alienated from the new state while the civilians were given secondary roles (Demirel 2002: 31). It must be underlined that, over the past decade, Turkey has witnessed a relatively good deal of democratization. However, there are a number of factors that produce problems for democratic consolidation. An important cultural trait that impedes democratic consolidation in Turkey is the relative life dissatisfaction that has been felt among the masses. As known, economic well-being has an influential role in shaping citizens level of support for the existing regime (Inglehart 1988). This support helps democracy to get consolidated along with other factors. Furthermore, despite being a relatively new development, the 1982 Constitution must not be neglected while evaluating Turkish political culture. Because the 1982 Constitution has a determinant role in shaping both cultural and structural features in Turkish political landscape. First of all, it attaches a special praise towards authority and hierarchy (Çağlar Keyder, ibid: 262). Also in the Constitution, the state is seen superior compared to the individuals and society. It is the first and the only constitution in The West that considers the state as a Holy State. Concluding Remarks The central attempt of this study has been to reveal the chief determinants of the relationship between political culture and democratic system in Turkey. It has been argued that, for a democracy to get established and consolidated along with the need of economic wealth and a proper, articulated social structure, also a proper political culture is needed too. The interruption of Turkish democratic life for several times can largely be explained from a cultural perspective seen in its political system. Particularly the strong state tradition inherited from Ottoman times and the problem-ridden civil-military relations are influent in impeding the democratic processes. 17
Begüm BURAK Political culture as noted above can be defined as a set of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards the political system as a whole. In Turkish case, nearly all of these orientations emphasize the transcendental image of the state while ignoring the fact that an enhanced civil society has an undisputedly major role contributing to democracy. So democratic system in Turkey has been quite fragile, however with the membership process to the European Union, democracy has been empowered to a considerable degree. On the other hand, ultrasecularist understanding in Turkey constitutes another factor that may be seen important in shaping political culture. State behavior towards religion impedes democratic consolidation. state-society relations until the late 1990s were quite deterrent for democratic consolidation. However, with the beginning of the European Union membership process, this trend has started to get eroded and democratic values have become more internalized. Finally, it must be stated that, for democratic consolidation in Turkey, it is now necessary to dismantle arrangements that impede democracy, judicially and legally eliminating reserved domains and ideological pacts that undermine the democratic process. 4 In addition, the politicization of the military must come to an end and the parliament must be based on electoral procedure and inclusiveness. Also the rule of law must be embraced as much as possible while putting an end to the rigid secularist understanding. It must also be underlined that, the historical background of Turkey from the very beginning of the Republic witnessed an evident antagonism between the state and the society. In addition to that, along with the military, the high bureaucracy of Turkey until the multi-party politics had a certain amount of distrust towards the society. So it may be stated that, Works Cited Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney.1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP. 4 See http://www.todayszaman. com/columnistdetail_getnewsbyid. action?newsid=190635 (Reached on June,2 2011). 18
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MODERN SİYASET KURAMINDA HERBERT MARCUSE VE OLUMSUZLAMA FELSEFESİ Herbert Marcuse in Modern Political Theory and His Critical Philosophy Şükrü NİŞANCI 1 Adem ÇELİK 2 ABSTRACT Herbert Marcuse was one of the prominent figures of the Frankfurt School and perhaps the most unique thinker who criticized reel Marxism for the lack of a comprehensive critique of capitalism. For him, the thing that is needed but not realized yet in (the study of) production and consumption relations of contemporary technological rationalism is a comprehensive critical/dialectical philosophy. Science s need for critique, especially in the case of economics, is systematically and intentionally neglected -not surprisingly- by the intellectuals of bourgeoisie revolution. Such a need was not adequately addressed by Marxist analysis which looked at the issue from production relations perspective. Moreover, for him, even reel socialism can not 1 Yrd.Doç.Dr. Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Kafkas Üniversitesi, snisanci@hotmail.com 2 Doktora Öğrencisi, Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, Kocaeli Üniversitesi, ademcelik36@hotmail.com 23