Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

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1 0033 EEYYLLÜÜLL PPEERRŞŞEEMBBEE SSAAYYI II: : Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1

2 Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ BAKANLAR KURULU KARARLARI 2009/15318 Elektrik İşleri Etüd İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Teşkilatında Düzenleme Yapılması Hakkında Karar 2009/15328 Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığının Taşra Teşkilatı Olarak Ankara İli nde Yer Alan Devlet Geleneksel Türk Tiyatrosu Topluluğu ile Devlet Halk Ozanları Topluluğu Müdürlüklerinin Kaldırılması Hakkında Karar 2009/15329 İçişleri Bakanlığının Merkez Teşkilatında, İller İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Bünyesinde 1 Adet Daire Başkanlığı ile 3 Adet Şube Müdürlüğü Kurulması Hakkında Karar 2009/15336 İran Menşeli Naylon İplik İthalatında Korunma Önlemi Uygulanmasına İlişkin Karar 2009/15344 Borçlanma Araçlarının İhraç Limitlerine Dair Karar 2009/15346 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının Merkez Teşkilatında 2 Adet Şube Müdürlüğü Kurulması Hakkında Karar 2009/15347 Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Kanunun Geçici 1 inci Maddesi ile 28/12/2005 Tarihli ve 5442 Sayılı Kanunun Geçici 1 inci Maddesi Gereğince Yapılan Başvuruların Sonuçlandırılma Süresinin Uzatılmasına Dair Karar 2009/15350 Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığının Taşra Teşkilatının Yeniden Düzenlenmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15354 Bazı Yerleşim Yerlerinin Uygulama Alanı Olarak Tespiti ve Bazı Yerleşim Alanlarındaki Üçüncü Sınıf Tarım Arazilerinde Dağıtılacak Toprak Normunun Belirlenmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15355 Türk Tasarım Danışma Konseyi Hakkında Karar 2009/15362 Bazı İllerde Mahalli İdare Birliklerinin Kurulması Hakkında Karar BAKANLIKLARA VEKALET ETME İŞLEMİ Maliye Bakanlığına, Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanı Mustafa DEMİR in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere Ulaştırma Bakanlığına, Çevre ve Orman Bakanı Veysel EROĞLU nun Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere YÖNETMELİKLER Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi ile İhracatçı Birliklerinin Kuruluş ve Görevleri Hakkında Yönetmelik Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi ve İhracatçı Birlikleri İnsan Kaynakları Yönetmeliği İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2

3 Askeri Kantin Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Kamu Taşınmazlarının Yatırımlara Tahsisine İlişkin Usul ve Esaslar Kıyı Emniyeti Genel Müdürlüğü Deniz ve Hava Bandı Telsiz Haberleşme Sistemlerinin Kurulması, Kullanım İzinlerinin Verilmesi, Ruhsatlandırılması ile Tarifelerinin Düzenlenmesine Dair Yönetmelik Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Öğrenci Yurtları Yönetmeliği İzmir Üniversitesi Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu Hazırlık Sınıfı Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliği Trakya Üniversitesi Yandal Programı Yönetmeliği Trakya Üniversitesi Çift Anadal Programı Yönetmeliği TEBLİĞ Universal Sertifikasyon ve Gözetim Hizmetleri Tic.Ltd.Şti.nin Kişisel Koruyucu Donanım Yönetmeliği Kapsamında Onaylanmış Kuruluş Olarak Görevlendirilmesine Dair Tebliğ Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Financial Economics Volume 90, Issue 1, Pages (October 2008) Structural models of credit risk are useful: Evidence from hedge ratios on corporate bonds Pages 1-19 Stephen M. Schaefer, Ilya A. Strebulaev Abstract Structural models of credit risk provide poor predictions of bond prices. We show that, despite this, they provide quite accurate predictions of the sensitivity of corporate bond returns to changes in the value of equity (hedge ratios). This is important since it suggests that the poor performance of structural models may have more to do with the influence of non-credit factors rather than their failure to capture the credit exposure of corporate debt. The main result of this paper is that even the simplest of the structural models [Merton, R., On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance 29, ] produces hedge ratios that are not rejected in time-series tests. However, we find that the Merton model (with or without stochastic interest rates) does not capture the interest rate sensitivity of corporate debt, which is substantially lower than would be expected from conventional duration measures. The paper also shows that corporate bond prices are related to a number of market-wide factors such as the Fama-French SMB (small minus big) factor in a way that is not predicted by structural models. 2. Data, sample selection, and descriptive statistics İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3

4 2.1. Data 2.2. Sample selection 2.3. Descriptive statistics on returns 3. Structural models and returns 4. Debt sensitivity to equity 4.1. Sensitivity in structural models 4.2. Preliminary comparison of sensitivity in the Merton model and actual data 4.3. Preliminary analysis of hedge ratios 4.4. Testing Merton model predictions of hedge ratios 4.5. Merton model predictions of hedge ratios with stochastic interest rates 5. Other determinants of returns on corporate bonds 6. Conclusion Appendix A. Corporate bond sensitivities with stochastic interest rates A.1. Term structure model A.2. Equity and yield curve sensitivities of corporate bonds Appendix B. Computation of standard errors for cross-sectional mean of hedge ratios References The only game in town: Stock-price consequences of local bias Pages Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik, Jeremy C. Stein Abstract Theory suggests that, in the presence of local bias, the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region. Using data on U.S. states and Census regions, we find clear-cut support for this proposition. Most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita. Regions with low population density e.g., the Deep South are home to relatively few firms per capita, which leads to higher stock prices via an only-game-in-town effect. 2. The model İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4

5 2.1. Basic assumptions 2.2. Prices of hometown and visible firms 2.3. Taking the model to the data Which firms go in a region's portfolio? Is regional income a good proxy for regional risk tolerance? Is book value a sensible measure of scale? How big is a region? Is there local bias in all regions of the country? 3. Data 3.1. Sources 3.2. Variable definitions 3.3. Anatomy of the RATIO variable 4. Empirical results 4.1. Baseline specification 4.2. Statistical inference 4.3. Baseline results 4.4. Additional controls 4.5. Alternative measures of RATIO 4.6. Evidence from electric utilities 4.7. Firms that switch regions 4.8. The interaction of RATIO and visibility 5. Discussion 5.1. Implications for expected returns and arbitrage 5.2. International asset pricing with segmented markets 6. Conclusions References The importance of IRS monitoring to debt pricing in private firms Pages Omrane Guedhami, Jeffrey Pittman Abstract We examine the link between Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring and yield spreads on private firms 144A bond issues. After controlling for security-specific and İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5

6 other firm-specific determinants, we provide evidence that debt financing is cheaper when the probability of a face-to-face IRS audit is higher. Consistent with another prediction, we find that IRS oversight has a stronger impact on bond pricing for private firms with high ownership concentration, which suffer worse agency problems between controlling shareholders and outside investors. Collectively, our research implies that IRS monitoring plays a valuable corporate governance role by reducing information asymmetry evident in borrowing costs. 2. Hypotheses development 3. Data and descriptive statistics 3.1. The sample 3.2. Regression variables Measuring credit spreads Measuring IRS monitoring at the federal level Measuring IRS monitoring at the district level Security-level controls Firm-level controls 3.3. Descriptive statistics 4. Empirical evidence 4.1. Tests of H 1 : the impact of IRS monitoring on debt pricing Main evidence: IRS audit rate Alternative tax enforcement measures Alternative hypotheses 4.2. Tests of H 2 : the impact of IRS monitoring on debt pricing by the extent of ownership concentration 5. Conclusions References The timing of financing decisions: An examination of the correlation in financing waves Pages Amy K. Dittmar, Robert F. Dittmar İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6

7 Abstract Why do corporate financing events occur in waves? We challenge recent evidence of the importance of valuation cycles in driving financing waves by documenting that the aggregate pattern of stock repurchases mirrors that of equity issuance and mergers, despite repurchases involving an opposite transaction. We then show that trends in financing decisions result from differing responses to the same economic stimulus: growth in GDP. Specifically, economic expansion reduces the cost of equity relative to the cost of debt, inducing firms to issue equity, and increases cash flow and also causes varying degrees of uncertainty, increasing stock repurchases. We document similar trends and provide similar motivation for merger waves. 2. Why does the volume of equity issues and repurchases vary over time? 2.1. Patterns in equity issuance 2.2. Patterns in stock repurchases 2.3. Joint determinants of repurchase and issuance 3. Empirical design and data 3.1. Determinants of issues and repurchases 3.2. Data 4. Empirical results 4.1. Drivers of issuing and repurchasing activity Determinants of repurchasing activity Determinants of equity issues 4.2. Understanding the drivers of financing decisions Determinants of the equity share Determinants of the repurchase share 4.3. Robustness 4.4. Further implications Mergers Long-run performance of repurchasing firms 5. Conclusion İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7

8 References Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists just vote no? Pages Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery, Tracie Woidtke Abstract We examine just vote no campaigns, a recent innovation in low-cost shareholder activist tools whereby activists encourage their fellow shareholders to withhold votes toward a director's election to express dissatisfaction with management performance or the firm's corporate governance structure. Grundfest [1993. Just vote no: a minimalist strategy for dealing with barbarians inside the gates. Stanford Law Review 45, ] argues that a substantial withheld vote motivates directors to take immediate action to avoid further embarrassment. We find a variety of supportive evidence, including operating performance improvements and abnormal disciplinary chief executive officer (CEO) turnover, indicating that such campaigns induce boards to take actions in shareholders interests. Furthermore, abnormal turnover is robust to controlling for concurrent events and firm- and CEO-specific controls. 2. Background on just vote no campaigns 2.1. Target firm characteristics and types of campaigns and proponents 2.2. Shareholder response to just vote no campaigns: stock price reaction and withheld vote support 2.3. Board response to specific activist campaign requests 3. Empirical analysis 3.1. Is a symbol enough? 3.2. Measure of campaign success: operating performance improvements 3.3. Alternative measure of campaign success: disciplinary CEO turnover Matched control sample approach Abnormal CEO turnover at just vote no campaign firms: univariate results 3.4. Abnormal CEO turnover at just vote no campaign firms: probit results and robustness tests İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8

9 Is forced CEO turnover at campaign firms driven by other external or internal pressures? 3.5. Wealth and operating performance effects of forced CEO turnover 3.6. Operating performance effects when forced CEO turnover does not occur 4. Conclusion References İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 9